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The dominant narrative of the Medellfn v. 
Dretke' line of cases
challenging widespread noncompliance by the 
United States with the
notification provisions of Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Con-
sular Relations (VCCR)
2 tells a story of vertical treaty enforcement.
The United States has agreed to be bound 
by a treaty that requires law
enforcement authorities to inform foreign 
nationals arrested in this
country of their right to notify their consulates 
and also requires au-
thorities to permit the foreign consulate 
to assist its nationals. The
United States has further agreed that the 
International Court of Jus-
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1 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam). I 
use the term "Medellin cases" to refer to
direct and collateral (state and federal post-conviction 
habeas) challenges brought by
capital defendants or death row convicts 
on the basis of a violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations notification 
provisions.
2 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
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tice (ICJ) has jurisdiction to resolve any disputes between state parties
arising under the treaty.3 In a 2003 opinion, the ICJ ordered the
United States to provide a remedy in the form of additional review for
fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in the United States. 4 One
of these Mexican defendants, Jose Ernesto Medellin, subsequently re-
quested federal habeas relief on the basis of the ICJ opinion. 5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Medellin's case, but in May 2005
dismissed the case on the ground that certiorari had been improvi-
dently granted.6 What effect U.S. federal courts should give the ICJ
opinion, including the ICJ's interpretation of obligations under the
VCCR and the nature of remedies for non-notification, was thus left
unresolved.
A year later, the Court revisited the question of vertical treaty en-
forcement in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.7 On the question of what ef-
fect U.S. courts should give to the ICJ's interpretation of a treaty, the
Court in Sanchez-Llamas noted that while the ICJ ruling was entitled to
"respectful consideration," in the absence of specific language in the
treaty, the Court was final arbiter on what remedies for failure to no-
tify would be available to individual defendants in U.S. courts.8 The
Court therefore held that the remedies requested-suppression of in-
criminating statements and habeas review of a procedurally defaulted
claim-were not constitutionally required.9 In short, the Court re-
jected the contention that "'the United States is obligated to comply
'with the Convention, as interpreted by the ICJ.' ,, ChiefJustice Roberts,
3 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596
U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
4 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 .C.J. 1, para. 12, at
11 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cj.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudg-
ment/imus imusjudgment20040331 .pdf.
5 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662; see infra Part II.A. (discussing the Medellin case).
6 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 667.
7 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005) (cert.
granted), was consolidated with a Virginia case, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 621
(2005) (cert. granted).
8 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
(1998)); see infra Part II; see also infra Part III (discussing remedies under the treaty).
9 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687-88. The majority did not address the ques-
tion of whether the VCCR created a judicially cognizable fight, instead holding that,
even if the treaty did create ajudicially cognizable right, (1) the remedy sought in the
Bustillo case (suppression of statements) was not available for violation of the notifica-
tion provision; and (2) the post-conviction review of the Article 36 violation sought in
Sanchez-Llamas had been procedurally defaulted. Id.
10 Id. at 2683 (quoting Brief of ICJ Experts as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (Nos. 04-10566 & 05-51)).
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writing for the majority, was clear: "If treaties are to be given effect as
federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a
matter of federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department.' -]
The academic literature on Medellin and the early analysis of
Sanchez-Llamas focuses on the vertical enforcement of international le-
gal obligations in the United States and the implications of the
Court's response to the ICJ for constitutional and international law. 12
This dominant narrative captures an important aspect of the case, but
misses a significant point about the legacy of Medellin. The central
legacy of the Medellin cases will not be their place in the jurisprudence
of treaty enforcement and compliance. 13 Rather, the enduring legacy
of the VCCR line of cases rests in its role in a larger transnational
norm convergence. The Medellin cases tell the story of the persistent
objection of the United States to any international restrictions on the
death penalty and the efforts of a transnational advocacy network of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), capital defense attorneys,
and foreign governments to nudge the United States toward limiting
the application of the death penalty, notwithstanding that persistent
objection. The claims in the VCCR cases arose not out of an abstract
concern about U.S. treaty violations, or even out of concerns about
the general effects of failures to notify foreign nationals of their
rights-though, to be sure, these concerns motivated particular actors
at particular times. That these cases arose at all was because the
United States was out of step with an international trend toward de
facto and de jure abolition of the death penalty.
Popular support for the death penalty in the United States has a
long provenance.' 4 At a time when international and foreign law and
practice was moving toward abolition, American legislative trends in
the late 1990s served to reduce the collateral procedural attacks availa-
ble to capital defendants.1 5 In response, and notwithstanding the per-
11 Id. at 2684 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
12 See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (2006) (discussing three views of enforceability of the ICJ
decision); see also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part II. Sanchez-Llamas will likely be a footnote in what will continue to
be a rich tradition of treaty interpretation and elaboration in the federal courts. In-
deed, Sanchez-Llamas may not even be the last word on remedies under the VCCR, as
the Court largely left to the states the scope and extent of judicial remedies for non-
compliance.
14 See infra Part 11.
15 SeeAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42
U.S.C.).
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sistent objection of the United States to accede to any international
obligation to do anything more regarding the death penalty than is
already proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,' 6 litigants seeking to
challenge both the legality of capital punishment and the statutory
restrictions on appeals began to invoke foreign and international law
as evidence of "evolving standards" of the restriction against "cruel
and unusual punishment." Some commentators and judges re-
sponded to these tactics by warning about the dangers of invoking-
by the merest of mention in a judicial opinion-any law to which the
United States did not consent.
17
Much to the consternation of these critics, the Supreme Court
has been receptive to appeals to foreign and international norms
when analyzing evolving standards under the Eighth Amendment. In
just the past three terms, the Court looked to laws and policies beyond
our shores in decisions to ban the death penalty in the case of
juveniles I8 and the mentally retarded. 19 Reaction has ranged from
outrage over the "outsourcing" of American law accompanied by nati-
vist fears of an erosion of sovereignty2 -and even death threats
againstJustices who deign to discuss foreign or international law 2 t-to
16 See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text (discussing the reservations the
United States attached to the death penalty regulations in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)).
17 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing the irrelevance of the views of the world community to interpreting the Constitu-
tion); see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Society of
Internatinoal Law Proceedings: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (Apr.
2, 2004), in 98 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 305, 310 (2004) ("If there was any thought
absolutely foreign to the founders of our country, surely it was the notion that we
Americans should be governed the way Europeans are.").
18 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
19 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. The Court has also invoked international law in
striking down homosexual sodomy laws. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
20 See, e.g., Laurence E. Rothberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death
Penalty, 35 GEo.J. INT'L L. 547, 547-48 (2004). Rothberg argues that "the sovereignty
of the United States regarding a significant aspect of its criminal justice system is
threatened . . . by the insinuation of international and foreign law into U.S. judicial
decision-making regarding certain aspects of death penalty administration." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
21 See Bill Mears, Justice Ginsburg Details Death Threat, CNN.coM, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/15/scotus.threat/index.html (discussing death
threats against Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg from what Ginsburg called an "irra-
tional fringe," who view reference to international law as "a huge threat to our Repub-
lic and Constitutional freedom").
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unqualified cheers that the Court was finally 
paying attention to its
brethren international and 
foreign courts.
2 2
Yet judges and commentators who may 
be sympathetic as a sub-
stantive or political matter to human 
rights standards set by interna-
tional treaties, and who also find 
themselves in agreement with
decisions handed down by international 
tribunals, have been careful
to note that the use of foreign and international 
sources is only appro-
priate so long as it is not construed 
as binding on the United States.
23
Despite these expressed limitations on 
the Court, and notwithstand-
ing the Sanchez-Llamas rejection of meaningful 
vertical enforcement
of the ICJ interpretation of a human rights 
claim, something interest-
ing has taken place in state and federal 
courts in the past decade.
While the United States in the exercise of 
its foreign affairs powers has
become more sophisticated in its use of 
reservations, understandings
and declarations to limit its obligations 
under the central human
rights regimes (e.g., the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)
24 and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)),25 
and
has become more confident in its rejection 
of other multilateral re-
gimes (e.g., the International Criminal 
Court)26 practice within U.S.
courts has moved closer to the international 
standards in the one area
22 See Amnesty Int'l, A Victory for International 
Law-An End to the Execution of Child
Offenders in the USA, THE WiNE, Apr. 2005, 
available at, http://web.amnesty.org/wire/
April2005/USA (referring to the Court's 
decision in Roper as a "victory for interna-
tional law"); Human Rights Watch, Supreme 
Court Ban Ends "Barbaric" Executions,
June 20, 2002, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/06/20/usdom
4O52.htm (celebrat-
ing the Atkins decision as putting an end 
to the "barbaric" practice of executing 
the
mentally retarded); Human Rights Watch, 
Supreme Court Ends Child Executions,
Mar. 1, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/O1/usdomlO
2 31.htm (praising
the Roper decision by saying, "[TJ he United 
States can now hold its head up as a just
society on this issue").
23 See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address 
at the American Society of International
Law Proceedings (Apr. 4, 2003), 
in 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 265, 
266 (2003);
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect 
to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM.
Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 45, 46 (2002); Antonin 
Scalia & Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, American University Washington 
College of Law, U.S. Ass'n of Const'l
Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance 
of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/
200 5 / 051 3.cfm [herein-
after Scalia-Breyer Debate].
24 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR].
25 Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treat-
ment or Punishment, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREArY Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into 
force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Conven-
tion Against Torture].
26 See Letter fromJohn R. Bolton, U.S. 
Under Sec'y of State for Arms Control and
Int'l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen. 
(May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.
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In the Medellin cases, the VCCR consular notification 
and assis-
tance provisions operated as a "norm portal," 
a formal procedural
mechanism through which external norms 
on the death penalty could
be imported into the U.S. legal system. 
I use the term "norm portal"
to describe any horizontal gateway that allows, 
through a formal procedural
mechanism or substantive right, the importation 
of external norms into a legal
system.28 A norm portal represents an alternative 
pathway for interna-
tional human rights norms to enter a 
legal system. Where those
norms may not otherwise be enforceable 
through traditional vertical
adjudicatory processes-either because 
the importing state has not
formally adopted the human rights obligation, 
or because vertical ju-
dicial structures have failed to enforce it-the 
norm portal permits
those norms to seep into the legal system, 
forcing mediation between
the external norm and the domestic standard. 
A norm portal has the
characteristic of being both formal, in that 
it relies on a binding pro-
cedural obligation such as a treaty, and horizontal, 
in that it operates
to import or export-and thus gives effect 
to-an international norm
across state borders without the vertical command 
of an international
tribunal or the highest domestic 
court.29
The VCCR norm portal enabled a transnational 
advocacy support
network comprised of individual advocates, 
NGOs, international and
regional organizations, and foreign state 
governments to support the
defense of capital defendants and engage 
in legal and political advo-
cacy at the federal, state and local level.
3 0 The network was successful
in winning clemency in one case, additional review 
in dozens of cases,
passing two state statutes codifying procedural 
rights for foreign na-
tionals, and setting general conditions 
through which the United
States complies with its consular notification 
obligations. Compliance
with the notification obligation has in turn 
permitted foreign govern-
ments to advocate directly on behalf of 




99 6 8 .htm (indicating that the United States 
did not intend
to become a party to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court).
27 See infra Part II.B.
28 See infra Part V. My thinking on norm 
portals is limited, at this stage, to spatial
portals that operate between legal systems. 
Norm portals may, however, operate tem-
porally, as with the Alien Tort Claims Act.
29 See infra Part V, for a discussion of 
other potential forms of norm portals.
30 See infra note 55 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Charles Epp's
notion of transnational advocacy support 
networks.
31 See infra Part V.
2006] 
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This shift has taken place notwithstanding 
the persistent objec-
tion of the United States to any international 
efforts to constrain its
use of capital punishment and without 
any change of official federal
policy about the death penalty or change 
in the U.S. position on the
VCCR.32 If the purpose of persistent objection 
to the abolitionist posi-
tion in international human rights regimes 
was to preserve complete
sovereign prerogative over the manner 
and timing of expansion of
criminal procedural rights in this country, 
it appears to have failed, at
least in regard to foreign national 
defendants. And, because the
VCCR cases came at a time when the death 
penalty was already under
concerted attack by advocates within 
the United States, the exploita-
tion of the VCCR norm portal has contributed 
to the momentum to-
ward convergence with the international 
abolitionist norm.
This Article examines the Medellin line 
of cases as an illustration
of how the VCCR norm portal operates, 
and draws conclusions about
how norm portals help facilitate international 
human rights conver-
gence. It proceeds in five parts. In Part 
I, I describe current predic-
tive and explanatory accounts of human 
rights behavior, and set forth
a typology of human rights norm transferal: 
Formal Vertical; Informal
Vertical; Formal Horizontal; and Informal 
Horizontal. In Part II, I
examine the "vertical" story of Medellin 
v. Dretke and the international
shift toward abolition of the death penalty 
that took place beginning
in the late 1980s. In Part III, I explore 
the ways in which the consular
function has traditionally been conceived 
as a means of mediation be-
tween two national legal systems, and how, 
by the 1990s, consular pro-
tection had absorbed formal international 
standards of due process
and fair treatment for foreign aliens.
In Part IV, I analyze how a transnational 
network of human rights
activists, NGOs, and defense lawyers carried 
out a concerted and coor-
dinated effort to bring national criminal 
justice systems into conform-
ance with the abolition of the death 
penalty, and in the process
produced a "norm cascade" on the question 
of consular notification
in death penalty cases: the U.S. government 
provided guidance and
training to state and local governments; 
state and local governments
trained police and courts; state and federal 
courts expanded procedu-
ral remedies for failure to notify (including 
suppression of confessions
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims); 
and states began to con-
sider and adopt legislation to enforce 
the notification requirement.
The VCCR now serves to mediate between 
the legal protections of-
32 See infra Part III (discussing U.S. commitment 
to the notification and assistance
provisions of the VCCR, notwithstanding its 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol).
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fered in the state and federal courts and the 
protections offered by
international human rights law.
In Part V, I explain that in the Medellin 
cases, the Formal Hori-
zontal procedural mechanism afforded 
by the VCCR norm portal
proved most salient to integrating the external 
norm of death penalty
abolition into the U.S. legal system. Norm 
portals offer formal entry
points through which transnational actors 
can confront persistent ob-
jectors or noncomplying states with the 
international standard. I sug-
gest that the norm portal mechanism may 
be at work in other formal
interstate procedural obligations (e.g., 
extradition treaties and inter-
national refugee law) that facilitate horizontal 
integration of interna-
tional human rights. I also raise potential 
critiques of the use of norm
portals and conclude that the democracy 
and sovereignty concerns
raised by the use of nonbinding foreign 
and international legal au-
thority in judicial opinions have less traction 
where norm portals are
adopted, because the portals themselves 
reflect formal decisions of
the political branches and are subject to 
political reversal. Norm por-
tals should therefore be embraced by human 
rights advocates who are
seeking to bring U.S. practice in line with international 
standards and,
correspondingly, feared by those who seek 
to keep the United States




I. ExPLANATORY AND PREDICTIVE ACCOUNTS 
OF TRANSNATIONAL
HuMAN RIGHTS NORm TRANSFER
If the United States has persistently objected 
to being bound to
international efforts to abolish the death 
penalty, how can interna-
tional or foreign law affect the application 
of the death penalty in the
United States? General theories of international 
law have struggled to
explain how international human rights 
law affects the behavior of
states.3 4 This is primarily because theories 
of international law seek to
33 President George Washington, Farewell 
Address to the People of the United
States (Sept. 26, 1796), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing'htm
("Against the insidious wiles of foreign 
influence . .. the jealousy of a free people
ought to be constantly awake, since history 
and experience prove that foreign influ-
ence is one of the most baneful foes of 
republican government.").
34 Oona Hathaway has created a helpful 
typology of general theories of interna-
tional law compliance: (1) rational actor 
models (realism ("Compliance as Coinci-
dence"); institutionalism ("Compliance as 
Strategy"); and liberalism ("Compliance as
By-Product of Domestic Politics")) and 
(2) normative models (managerial model
("Compliance Is Due to a Norm of Compliance 
and Fostered by Persuasive Dis-
course"); fairness model ("Compliance Occurs 
when Rules Are Legitimate andJust");
transnational legal process model ("Compliance 
Occurs Because Norms Are Internal-
[VOL 82:2
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explain how states behave in interaction with one another and how
international rules and institutions affect interstate behavior. The in-
ternational human rights system, by contrast, addresses itself to two
separate, but related, questions: (1) how states treat the rights of their
own inhabitants; and (2) whether and how states care about human
rights conditions in other states. The prevailing accounts of interna-
tional law are more helpful in responding to the second question. 35
But theories about interstate relations and rulemaking are less helpful
to answering the first question and explaining human rights behavior
which, for the most part, takes place exclusively through domestic
processes.
The insufficiency of general international law theory to respond
to these questions about human rights behavior has led legal scholars
to look to political science and sociology to supplement our under-
standing of how law and legal regimes affect human rights practices.
These current approaches fall under three general categories: (1) lib-
eral theory; (2) constructivism/socio-legal theory; and (3) transna-
tional legal process.
A. Liberal Theory
Liberal theory seeks to account for human rights behavior by ex-
amining domestic political structures and processes 36 Liberal theory
predicts that certain domestic conditions (eg., commitment to demo-
cratic institutions) are prerequisites to achieving state compliance
with its obligations under the international human rights system.37 It
posits that a central purpose of signing onto international obligations
ized")). Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, I1l YALE L.J.
1935, 1935-36 (2002). Hathaway's analysis was limited to how these theories would
predict compliance with human rights treaties to which a state has acceded, in order
to measure the effectiveness of human rights treaties. Id. at 1963-64.
35 1 have written elsewhere about the value, for example, of rational choice analy-
sis to understanding how and when governments adopt foreign policies of human
rights. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 393, 397-98 (2006). The foreign states who partici-
pated in the supranational and domestic litigations brought in response to U.S. non-
compliance with the VCCR were, in part, motivated by foreign policy considerations,
calculating how and when to leverage their political capital against the United States.
See infra Parts II, IV.
36 Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 517, 521 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2001). Lib-
eral theory responds to the neo-liberal institutionalism, which, like classical realism,
emphasizes the role of state interest in creating incentives to enter international insti-
tutions that help coordinate behavior. Id.
37 See Hathaway, supra note 34, at 1953.
20o6]
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is to "lock-in" the commitment to certain domestic behavior in the
future. The rationales for locking-in an obligation among a commu-
nity of liberal states are based on some instrumentalist rational choice
calculations (for example, membership in trade and security organiza-
tions) about the value of liberal international institutions to the ongo-
ing viability and welfare of the state. Of central importance to
compliance, therefore, is the creation of regimes that persuade or co-
erce appropriate behavior. This is not merely a procedural claim, as
the appropriate behavior among liberal states is premised on the
universality of human rights and the normative value of promoting
human rights as a means to achieve global peace.3s
In this case, the United States is either not a party to, or has taken
reservations to, the central instruments outlawing or restricting use of
the death penalty. However, the United States is a party to the VCCR.
Liberal theory would suggest that the ratification of that treaty would
create an opportunity for domestic interest groups to bring pressure
on domestic political institutions to comply with the obligation. The
availability of a binding commitment under which to bring pressure
on domestic actors proved salient in the Medellin line of cases.3 9 Be-
cause the VCCR is silent on the question of the death penalty, we
need to look beyond liberal theory to find an explanation for how to
change domestic behavior in a state that has expressly objected to the
international standard.
B. Constructivist and Socio-Legal Accounts
Constructivist and socio-legal accounts of transnational behavior
can help fill some of the gaps in liberal theory, such as how to account
for changes in behavior of a persistent objector who has real power
within the international community. Ryan Goodman and DerekJinks
have criticized traditional liberal internationalist approaches for over-
emphasizing the processes of coercion and persuasion and misunder-
standing or underestimating the role of the element of sociological
acculturation, which they describe as "the general process by which
actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding
culture." 40 This might suggest that, for the United States, the ques-
tion is not so much how to enforce the international law abolishing
38 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513-53 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 509-14 (1995).
39 See infra Parts IV, V.
40 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
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the death penalty, since the United States has rejected that obligation,
but how to change the belief patterns that create support for the
death penalty.
Constructivism approaches international relations by focusing
"on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in
politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or 'inter-
subjective' ideas and understandings on social life."41 Constructivism
does not make any particular claims about substantive outcomes of
these processes, but, like rational choice theory, focuses on the "na-
ture of social life and social change."42 Whereas in rational choice,
agents (i.e., states) act rationally to maximize their preferences, under
a constructivist approach, "agents and structures are mutually consti-
tuted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not other-
wise." 43 Whereas rational choice analysis requires the assumption that
actors are motivated primarily by the desire to maximize their utility,
constructivism requires the assumption that actors-including
states-are shaped by the social factors of their milieu.44 For interna-
tional human rights, constructivism offers a method for analyzing so-
cial interactions of states, NGOs, and individuals with one another
and with legal structures that takes into account the power of norms
and ideas. Most important, it offers a framework for assessing the ways
in which norms, ideas and actors interact with domestic processes. 45
One way in which this interaction occurs is through norm entre-
preneurs, or transnational advocacy networks, "working internation-
ally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services." 46 This
definition is intended to apply to the nongovernmental actors which
help construct legal rules by calling attention to issues through public-
41 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 391, 392
(2001).
42 Id. at 393.
43 Id.
44 Constructivists reject the claim that their approach is unhelpful to understand-
ing causation, noting that "understanding how things are put together and how they
occur . . .is essential in explaining how they behave and what causes political out-
comes." Id. at 394. See Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International
Law, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1265, 1272 (2006).
45 See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction to THE POWER OF HUMAN RiGi-rs 1, 3
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
46 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 2 (1998).
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ity and information campaigns. 47 Where there has previously been no
legal action, these networks can make it amenable to legal action:
"Frames that later appear in the law often originate in groups in civil
society." 48 In the human rights area, constructivism suggests that the
role of the state may therefore be less salient to norm transformation,
as states are often only "reacting to political changes fomented in an
increasingly transnational civil society."
49
In the domestic context, Cass Sunstein has explained the phe-
nomenon of rapid change in social behavior as resulting in "norm
cascades." 50 Malcolm Gladwell has adopted the sociological concept
of "tipping points," to describe the moment when a social idea or
norm crosses a magic threshold that leads to widespread adoption. 5'
Constructivists apply a similar approach to the international system,
looking for tipping points in the spread of ideas or norms across na-
tional borders. Studies of transnational advocacy networks suggest
five steps to changing norms in nonconforming states, which could be
considered the transnational norm cascade or tipping point: (1) a sit-
uation of domestic repression/nonconformity; (2) initial NGO mobil-
ization and government denial of the right; (3) tactical concessions by
the government; (4) rhetorical acceptance of the human right norm;
and, finally, (5) compliant behavior.
5 2
The central critique of constructivism is that it is insufficiently
concrete or specific, and thus fails to provide an effective framework
through which to make causal predictions of state behavior and/or to
design a blueprint for regimes or strategies for addressing human
rights violations.53 Constructivism may tell us something about global
processes and interactions at a macro level, but to the critics offers
47 Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and Interna-
tional Institutions, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301, 302 (2003).
48 Id.
49 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 41, at 400.
50 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912
(1996) (defining norm cascades).
51 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 12-13 (2002).
52 Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 36, at 531.
53 For an overview of constructivism and its rationalist critics see James Fearon &
Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 52, 54-58; see alSoJACK L. GOLsMImH &
Emc A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-72 (2005); Goodman &Jinks,
supra note 40, at 624 ("Regime design debates often turn on unexamined or unde-
fended empirical assumptions about foundational matters such as the conditions
under which external pressure can influence state behavior, which social or political
forces are potentially effective, and the relationship between state preferences and
material and ideational structure at the global level.").
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little help in predicting how a norm shift-for example from tolera-
tion of the death penalty to abolition-will take place.
54
International relations constructivism can draw useful lessons
from studies of domestic processes to understand how human rights
norm cascades are initiated and sustained. The political scientist
Charles Epp has identified domestic "support structures for legal mo-
bilization" as a dependent variable in accounting for the rights revolu-
tion in the United States of the Warren and Burger eras:
[Slustained judicial attention and approval for individual rights
grew primarily out of pressure from below, not leadership from above. This
pressure consisted of deliberate, strategic organizing by rights advo-
cates. And strategic rights advocacy became possible because of the
development of ... the support structure for legal mobilization,
consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rights-advocacy lawyers, and
sources of financing, particularly government-supported financing.5 5
The process that has come to bear on foreign nationals facing the
death penalty in the United States can be analogized to this type of
advocacy support structure.
5 6
C. Transnational Legal Process
1. Traditional TLP
Harold Koh's theory of transnational legal process (TLP) is based
on broad constructivist notions and provides more specificity about
how international law is integrated into domestic legal systems-that
is, how international law "comes home."5 7 Koh posits that norm-inter-
nalization among transnational actors (states, international institu-
tions, NGOs, and individual participants in the legal system) occurs
through three phases: interaction provoked by one or more transna-
tional actors seeking to impose the norm on another actor; interpreta-
tion or enunciation of the norm applicable to the situation; and,
54 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 40, at 624 n.5 (citing Jeffrey T. Checkel, The
Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WoRLD POL. 324, 325 (1998)).
55 CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION 2-3 (1998) (emphasis added). In
the VCCR context, foreign governments provided some financing to NGOs and advo-
cates. See infra Part lV.A-B.
56 See infra Part IV.B.
57 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1998); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 Nzn. L. R~v. 181, 184-87 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2624-29 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Na-
tions Obey International Law?] (reviewing ABRAM CHAS & ANTON A HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEw SOVEIGNTY (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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finally, successful internalization of the norm by the party targeted by
the first party's interaction. 58 "It is through this transnational legal
process, this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation and internal-
ization, that international law acquires its 'stickiness,' that nation-
states acquire their identity, and that nations come to 'obey' interna-
tional law out of perceived self-interest."59
Koh's theory is predictive, even instructional, in terms of govern-
mental and advocacy strategies: "If transnational actors obey interna-
tional law as a result of repeated interaction with other actors in the
transnational legal process, a first step is to empower more actors to
participate." 60 He also considers the importance of creating addi-
tional fora to provide opportunities for interpretation and enuncia-
tion of human rights norms and of adopting strategies of social,
political and legal internalization of norms. 61 TLP would predict first
a "horizontal"-that is interstate-interaction on a norm, which is
then followed by adoption through "vertical" processes, e.g., judicial
adoption of a norm. In 1997, Koh posited that, in light of the fact that
the existing horizontal transnational regimes in human rights were
notoriously weak, the best compliance strategies may be "vertical strat-
egies of interaction, interpretation, and internalization," by which he
meant working within judicial systems to announce norms that would
bind the political actors who can bring about human rights
compliance.
62
This TLP process of the horizontal interaction followed by verti-
cal process helps explain, for example, the Atkins v. Virginia" and
58 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 57, at 2646.
59 Id. at 2655.
60 Id. at 2656. Koh goes on to explain: "For activists, the constructive role of
international law in the post-Cold War era will be greatly enhanced if nongovernmen-
tal organizations seek self-consciously to participate in, influence, and ultimately en-
force transnational legal process by promoting the internalization of international
norms into domestic law." Id. at 2658.
61 Id. at 2656-57 ("Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial inter-
pretation, legislative action or some combination of the three.").
62 Id. at 2656. A key participant in the VCCR narrative has written that "Koh's
writings on the 'transnational legal process' provide a useful conceptual framework"
of analysis for understanding the role of international human rights law in death pen-
alty litigation in the United States. Sandra Babcock, The Role of International Law in
United States Death Penalty Cases, 15 LEinDN J. INT'L L. 367, 369 (2002). Koh has used
his own theory to explain the developments of the VCCR death penalty cases. Harold
Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DA-vS
L. REv. 1085, 1091-97 (2002).
63 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Roper v. Simmons64 cases. In those cases, the Court announced stan-
dards restricting the death penalty which were in part premised on an
understanding of what the international community required.65 In
the Medellin line of cases, TLP might predict that the VCCR norm will
have best effect when it is formally elaborated through interstate inter-
action-perhaps facilitated by international institutions-and then
announced by the ICJ or the Supreme Court before being integrated
into constitutional criminal procedural requirements.
2. Networks
Transnational network theory is a complement to TLP that fo-
cuses on the ways disaggregated governmental functions operate
across borders. Anne-Marie Slaughter defines transnational networks
as representing "all the different ways that individual government in-
stitutions are interacting with their counterparts either abroad or
above them, alongside more traditional state-to-state interactions. 66
A governmental network "is a pattern of regular and purposive rela-
tions among like government units working across the borders that
divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic'
from the 'international' sphere. '6 7 Horizontal networks are those that
operate across national borders between, for example, counterpart
governmental officials in different countries. 68 A vertical network op-
erates between national entities and supranational entities and requires
"the relatively rare decision by states to delegate their sovereignty to
an institution above them with real power-a court or a regulatory
commission."69
64 543 U.S. 555 (2005).
65 See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. J. INT'L L.
43, 48-49, 52 (2004); Koh, supra note 62, at 1118-29 (defining transnational or
"transgovernmental" networks as "involv[ing] specialized domestic officials directly in-
teracting with each other").
66 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER 14 (2004); see also Kal Raustiala,
The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2002).
67 SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at 14.
68 Id. at 13.
69 Id. The purest form of vertical judicial network exists at the EU, where the ECJ
has power to bind the courts of member states of the EU. The International Court of
Justice arguably has more limited effect, as it does not serve to directly bind courts in
the same way the ECJ binds national courts of the EU, or the U.S. Supreme Court
binds the federal and state courts. But its decisions are nonetheless binding on state
parties that have acceded to its jurisdiction. It is precisely this question of delegation
of national judicial authority to the ICJ that lies at the heart of the nationalist/inter-
nationalist debate in Medellin.
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Judicial networks theory is a sub-species of governmental network
theory that accounts for norm transfer as a reflection ofjudicial inter-
action-both horizontal (through trans-judicial dialogue) 70 and verti-
cal (giving domestic judicial effect to the opinions of international
tribunals). 7" Horizontal judicial dialogue describes the process
through which judges from jurisdictions around the world engage in
direct and indirect conversations about the law, which are then re-
flected in their own opinions.
Direct judicial conversations occur at the myriad and ever-increas-
ing opportunities for judges from around the world to meet one an-
other at conferences, seminars and exchange programs. 72 These
direct encounters are posited as transformative, "socializ[ing] their
members as participants in a common judicial enterprise." 73 They are
also derided as creating "cosmopolitan" judges who envision them-
selves as attendees at a sort of global cocktail party and who care far
too much about what their colleagues on other supreme courts think
of them.7
4
Related to these direct encounters are the indirect, "messy con-
versations" that Justice Breyer referred to when discussing the citation
of foreign courts by the Supreme Court and citation of our Supreme
Court by high courts in foreign jurisdictions.75 Indirect conversations
also take place semi-vertically between national court opinions and
the opinions of international courts, tribunals and commissions.
70 Dialogue is often cited as the rationale for citation to foreign and international
legal opinions. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 23, at 266-67; Melissa A. Waters, Mediating
Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 488-90 (2005).
71 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv 2029, 2086-2123 (2004);Jenny S. Martinez, Towards
an InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 460-77 (2003). For a summary of
the work the American Society of International Law (ASIL) has done is this area, see
FREDRIc L. KiRGis, THE AMERICAN SOCIEmTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'S FIRST CENTlnY
(2006). For an example of how ASIL trains U.S. judges on international law, see
DAv wJ. BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2003).
72 SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at 96-99.
73 Id. at 99. I have argued elsewhere that international travel and engagement
with scholars and judges at international seminars may have influenced Justice Harry
Blackmun's "internationalist" turn. Margaret E. McGuinness, The Internationalism of
Justice Harry Blackmun, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1289, 1304-06 (2005).
74 Justice Kennedy has been singled out for such criticism-directly and indi-
rectly-after he authored the majority opinions in Lawrence and Roper. See, e.g.,
Scalia, supra note 17, at 309-10; Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's
Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at
42.
75 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 23.
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These conversations are semi-vertical in that they sometimes occur in
discussion of nonbinding, but informative precedent, and sometimes
they are persuasive authority.76 Where they are between completely
separate courts that operate under the assumption of comity, or judi-
cial equality, they are purely horizontal interaction.
The line between vertical authority and horizontal conversations
is further blurred in the United States as a result of the predominantly
dualist approach to international law within the American constitu-
tional order.7 7 Indeed, the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas sug-
gests that, even where the United States has delegated adjudicatory
authority to a supranational court via treaty obligation, the last-in-time
rule and federalism may limit the enforceability of the international
adjudication. 78 As a result of this dualism, the constitutionality of cer-
tain international adjudication has been challenged by some scholars
as representing impermissible delegations of judicial authority. 79
Others have sought to reconcile some delegations as within the pow-
ers of the political branches.8 0
Setting aside the constitutionality of giving effect to international
judgments or citing foreign judges, the global judiciary theory is defi-
cient for the separate reason that it has a tendency to overemphasize
the role of judicial elites (supreme and high courts) in the process of
transnational norm transfer.81 Correspondingly, it tends to under-
76 An example of the latter is the effect of European Court of Human Rights
decisions on constituent national courts in Europe. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at
80-81; see also Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273, 295-96 (1997) (discussing the different
meanings state parties to the European Convention give to the obligation to abide by
ECHR opinions).
77 I say "predominantly" because several constitutional doctrines help save the
application of the international rule. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW § 115(1) (a) (1987) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of
international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United
States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if
the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled."); see also CURTIS
A. BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 568-80 (2d ed. 2006) (dis-
cussing the Charming Betsy doctrine requiring federal courts to construe statutes so
that they do not violate international law).
78 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2672-73 (2006); infia notes
89-90 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., Ku, supra note 12, at 58-63.
80 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1492 (2004).
81 For a view that nonelite courts have a role to play, see Janet Koven Levit, A Tale
of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in the Transna-
tional Legal Conversation, 12 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 183-86 (2004).
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emphasize the crucial role of litigants, advocacy groups, and, signifi-
cantly, the trial court judges who oversee the criminal justice system.
It is thus more helpful in explaining whether (and which) federal ap-
pellate and Supreme Courtjudges are receptive, as a matter ofjudicial
pre-disposition, to appeals to foreign and international trends, and
less helpful to the project of explaining how and through whom the
transnational dialogue over a particular norm originates.
3. Responding to the Realist Critiques
A central critique of the TLP and constructivist, socio-legal ac-
counts comes from the realist/rational choice schools of thought to
which these process-oriented theories initially responded.82 The real-
ist/rational choice account places nation-states and state action at the
center of events, and attempts to account for all human rights behav-
ior as a reflection of a state monolith balancing fair and decent treat-
ment of its inhabitants against concerns for state security.83 This
approach is useful insofar as it explains the basic instrumentalism of
states when they act as political entities within international institu-
tions, but it fails to account adequately for the actions of the disaggre-
gated elements of the state in domestic politics and of nonstate
actors.8
4
The rational choice "sovereigntist" theorists have a normative
agenda which additionally weakens their positive account: they do not
think states should care about the welfare of individuals in other coun-
tries, at least not in the sense of cosmopolitanism or universality. 8'
The rationale for that normative claim rests on realism-in which
power matters to international relations-and American exceptional-
ism-which posits that the world may be better off when the hegemon
82 1 do not mean to suggest that rational choice does not explain behavior within
the liberal, constructivist or TLP theories. Each of them assumed, to one degree or
another, that participants in the international legal system act at times to further cer-
tain self-interest.
83 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 170-72; see also Eric A. Posner, Interna-
tional Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 797, 804-19 (2005) (dis-
cussing the way nonstate actors influence states to comply with or violate international
law).
84 See Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 195, 198 (discussing the limitations of realist theory to
explain the international human rights system).
85 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 209-15; see Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel




is free to behave without restraint.8 6 I do not intend to respond to
that claim here, but I do intend to demonstrate that the assumptions
about state action underlying the rational choice sovereigntist ap-
proach are flawed when applied to international human rights.
The best (or worst) the rational choice sovereigntists can say
about the constructivist and legal process accounts is that they are not
terribly helpful. To be sure, there is frequently a failure to connect
investigatory, descriptive case studies and data collection with the
work being done to systemize and theorize how human rights behav-
ior changes. And it is surely also the case that there are not enough
systematic case studies available against which to test constructivist the-
ories. But perhaps these critics have not been looking in the right
places or do not want to acknowledge processes that are occurring all
around.
D. A Typology of Norm Transfer
This Article is an effort to connect the theoretical with thick
description. Case studies tend to present the universe from a worm's
eye view. Integrative approaches that take account of the fine details
of a particular litigation along with the interstate interactions that al-
ter and in some cases drive events may be a useful means of explain-
ing the broader legal trends. Examining the action on the ground in
a line of cases that raise claims in U.S. courts-claims that were initi-
ated and elaborated through transnational interactions-can illumi-
nate both how international human rights norms are transmitted and
integrated and the logical limits of vertical and horizontal processes.
Each of these predictive and explanatory accounts can be seen
operating within a typology of methods of international human rights
norm integration: (1) Formal Vertical (supranational and domestic
adjudication of rights); (2) Informal Vertical (norm-setting, aspira-
tional charters and institutions); (3) Formal Horizontal (procedural
legal gateways); (4) Informal Horizontal (informal political and social
interaction, information sharing, and acculturation). 7 As this Article
demonstrates, each of these methods played a role in the Medellfn
cases, and at times, the processes interacted with one another. But
one proved most salient to the ultimate norm shift: the formal hori-
zontal process represented by the VCCR norm portal.
86 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 83-89; see NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS:
THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 186-93 (2004).
87 See infra tbl.1 (illustrating examples of each of these methods of norm inte-
gration).
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II. A TALE OF Two LEGAL NoRMs: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS MEETS THE ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALrY
The Medellfn story presents, at first blush, a question that is cen-
trally about vertical integration and the command and control aspects
of international law compliance: when must a national court take cog-
nizance of a decision of an international tribunal? The answer to that
question involves a range of highly contested constitutional questions
concerning whether U.S. courts are permitted or required to give ef-
fect to ICJ judgments, the constitutionality of the executive branch
placing restrictions on U.S. treaty obligations, the effect of later-in-
time congressional statutes to U.S. treaty obligations, and the ability of
the federal government to restrict, through international agreement,
the police powers of the federal states.s8
Medellfn illustrates how the persistent objection of the United
States to abolish the death penalty raised the stakes for international
advocacy networks and ultimately led to the adoption of the VCCR as
a norm portal to affect change in the U.S. legal system. When the
Supreme Court dismissed Medellfn v. Dretke on the ground that certio-
rari had been improvidently granted, the Court appeared to be avoid-
ing a question of treaty enforcement of vital importance to the fate of
the petitioner and to dozens of other death row inmates: how should
federal and state courts give effect to a decision of the ICJ? The ques-
tion was partially resolved by Sanchez-Llamas, in which the Court held
that while the ICJ's earlier decision in Avena was entitled to "respect-
ful consideration," the ICJ interpretation of judicial remedies under
the VCCR was not binding on U.S. courts.8 9 Sanchez-Llamas did not
arise directly from the capital defendants whose rights were at issue in
the ICJ case, and thus the Court's opinion did not address the final
disposition of Medellin, which turns on what judicial effect will be
given to President Bush's decision to abide by the ruling of the ICJ
88 There has been vigorous scholarly debate on these questions. See Curtis Brad-
ley, Lori Fischer Damrosch, & Martin Flaherty, Discussion: Medellin v. Dretke: Federal-
ism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 681-88 (2005) (edited
version of debate held at Columbia Law School); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and
the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MicF. L. REv. 1075, 1278-1310 (2000); Ku, supra note 12, at 20-22; Swaine, supra
note 80, at 1604-11; David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights Law Perspective on
Grutter and Gratz, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 275, at 280-83 (2004); see also Bruce Acker-
man & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995).
89 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2672-73 (2006).
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and require the states to provide additional review in those cases.90
How Medellin came to be heard by the Supreme Court and the impli-
cations of Medellin's claims about the import of consular assistance,
had far broader repercussions in death penalty practice in the United
States than the question of constitutional law suggests.
A. The Vertical Story: Avena and Medellfn v. Dretke
Jose Ernesto Medellin is a Mexican national sitting on death row
in Texas. In 1993, Medellin was convicted of murder in a Texas state
court and sentenced to death. 9 At the time of his arrest, he told the
police that he was Mexican, but he was not informed of his right
under the VCCR to contact the Mexican consulate.9 2 Medellin was
represented at trial by a court-appointed attorney who failed to raise
the VCCR claim. 93 On April 29, 1997, after a number of appeals, Mex-
ican consular authorities finally learned of Medellin's detention when
he wrote to them from death row, and they began assisting him.
9 4
Medellin's attorneys on appeal filed a federal habeas corpus petition
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Novem-
ber 2001. Eighteen months later, the district court denied habeas re-
lief on all claims.
95
In January 2003, while Medellin's case was pending in district
court, the Mexican government initiated proceedings in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice against the United States, alleging violations of
the VCCR in the cases of Medellin and fifty-three other Mexican na-
tionals who had been sentenced to death in state criminal proceed-
ings.9 6 Mexico argued in its application to the ICJ that the United
90 See Mark Warren, Unanswered Questions Remain After U.S. Supreme Court Ruling,
ARTICLE 36 UPDATE, July 2006, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/news.html.
91 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-CV-4078, slip op. at I (S.D. Tex.June 25, 2003).
92 Id. at 18
93 In 1993, the claim was unknown to criminal defense lawyers in the United
States. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
94 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States in Support of Jose Er-
nesto Medellin at 3, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Grim.
App. 2005).
95 Medellin, slip op. at 1.
96 Application Instituting Proceedings, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 69-267 (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Application of Mexico in the
Avena Case), available at http://www.icj-ci.org/cijwww/cdocket/cmus/cmusorder/
cmus._capplication_20030109.PDF. Mexico withdrew its application with respect to
two of the nationals on the grounds that one was a dual national of the United States
and Mexico and upon learning that the second national had, in fact, received notifi-
cation of his consular rights. See Sarah M. Ray, Comment, Domesticating International
Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
2oc,6]
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States had failed to comply with its obligations 
under the notification
provisions of Article 36 of the VCCR in fifty-four 
cases in eleven fed-
eral states in which Mexican nationals had 
been convicted of a capital
crime and sentenced to death.
97 Mexico petitioned the court to rec-
ognize that "the right to consular notification 
under the Vienna Con-
vention is a human right," and that 
the United States should be
ordered to "restore the status quo ante," 
by overturning the convic-
tions and sentences of the Mexican nationals 
that were done "in viola-
tion of the United States international 
legal obligations."
98 Mexico
further requested that the United States 
be ordered to take "steps nec-
essary and sufficient" to ensure that domestic 
law gave full effect "to
the purposes for which the rights afforded 
by Article 36 are intended"
and "establish a meaningful remedy at 
law for violations of the rights
afforded to Mexico and its nationals by Article 
36 of the Vienna Con-
vention," including by removing any 
procedural bars for "failure
timely to raise a claim or defence [sic] based 
on the Vienna Conven-
tion" in any cases where the United States 
breached its notification
obligations.99
Jurisdiction of the Court rested in the 
Optional Protocol of the
VCCR, under which any dispute under 
the Convention would be sub-
ject to adjudication by the ICJ, and which 
the United States ratified
when it joined the treaty.'
00 By acceding to ICJ jurisdiction, the
United States was agreeing that any ICJ 
interpretation of the United
tions, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1760 (2003) 
(discussing how the United States responded
to LaGrand by having three of the 
fifty-four Mexican nationals' sentences 
commuted
by the Governor of Illinois). Mexico 
further alleged that the United States 
had vio-
lated its obligations under Articles 5 and 
36 of the VCCR by "arresting, detaining,
trying, convicting, and sentencing [to 
death]" fifty-two Mexican nationals. 
Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, para. 12, at 10 (Mar. 
31), avail-
able at http://www.ici.c 
ck e t/ im u s/ im u sju d gm e n t/ im u s im u sJu
d g-
ment_20040331.pdf.
97 Application of Mexico in the 
Avena Case, supra note 96, paras. 
1-2.
98 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. para. 12, at 11.
99 Id, at 19-20. At the time of the 
original application, Mexico filed 
a separate
request for provisional measures to 
ensure that none of the Mexicans 
on death row
would be executed during the time 
the case was being decided by the 
ICJ. The ICJ
issued a provisional order on February 
5, 2003, concluding that three Mexican 
nation-
als were most likely to face execution 
within six months of the application 
and order-
ing the United States to "take all measures 
necessary" to ensure that those individuals
'are not executed pending final judgment 
in these proceedings." Id. para. 3, 
at 8.
100 Optional Protocol, supra note 
3. The ICJ has both compulsory 
and com-
promissory jurisdiction. Statute of 
the International Court ofJustice 
arts. 34-38,June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 
993 (outlining the competence of 
the ICJ). The
Optional Protocol is an example of 
compromissory jurisdiction. Article 
I of the Op-
tional Protocol provides:
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States' obligations under the VCCR 
would act as a command on the
United States. In 1979, the United 
States had relied on the ability of
the ICJ to make a pronouncement that would 
hold Iran, a VCCR sig-
natory state, legally responsible for the taking 
of official U.S. hostages
in 1979.101 When Mexico brought the 
Avena case before the ICJ in
January 2003,102 it appeared to be 
following the United States' foot-
steps-availing itself of the binding 
supranational adjudication mech-
anism required under the treaty.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 
guarantees that detained for-
eign nationals are informed of their 
right to notify their consular of-
ficer and that the consular officer 
is afforded free access and
communication with any national 
who so requests it:
(1) (a) consular officers shall be free to 
communicate with nationals
of the sending State and to have access 
to them. Nationals of the
sending State shall have the same freedom 
with respect to commu-
nication with and access to consular officers 
of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities 
of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the 
consular post of the sending
State if, within its consular district, a 
national of that State is ar-
rested or committed to prison or to custody 
pending trial or is de-
tained in any other manner. Any communication 
addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or deten-
tion shall be forwarded by the said authorities 
without delay. The
said authorities shall inform the person 
concerned without delay of
his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right 
to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody 
or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange 
for his legal representa-
tion. They shall also have the right to 
visit any national of the send-
ing State who is in prison, custody or 
detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, 
consular officers shall re-
frain from taking action on behalf of a national 
who is in prison,
custody or detention if he expressly 
opposes such action-1
0 3
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the [Vienna]
Convention shall lie within the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International
Court of justice and may accordingly be 
brought before the Court by a writ-
ten application made by any party to the 
dispute being a Party to the present
Protocol."
Id. art. I. Mexico acceded to the Optional 
Protocol on March 5, 2002. See infra note
391 and accompanying text.
101 In 1980 the ICJ issued a judgment 
in a dispute between the United States 
and
Iran involving U.S. diplomatic and consular 
staff in Tehran. United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3 (May 24).
102 See Application of Mexico in the 
Avena Case, supra note 96.
103 VCCR, supra note 2, art. 36(1).
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Article 36(2) further provides that, while the 
obligations of state
parties to the VCCR shall be exercised "in 
conformity with the laws
and regulations" of the state, they must 
"enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded 
under this article are
intended. 1
1 0 4
The importance of consular contact to a 
defendant's criminal
case was long recognized by Mexico, and 
Mexican consular offices
had been active in protecting the interests 
of their nationals as early as
the 1920s.10 5 By 2003, Mexico had an additional 
program in place
under which it provided direct assistance 
to capital defendants in the
United States by providing funding for experts 
and investigators, gath-
ering mitigating evidence, acting as a liaison 
with Spanish-speaking
family members, and ensuring that Mexican 
nationals are represented
by competent and experienced defense counsel.
10 6 At the time of Me-
dellin's arrest in 1993, this formal program 
was not in place.
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ issued its decision, 
the Avena rul-
ing.107 The court found the United States 
had breached parts of the
VCCR in the case of Medellin and fifty-three 
others by failing "to in-
form detained Mexican nationals of their 
rights under that para-
graph" and "to notify the Mexican 
consular post of the[ir]
detention. "108 The court also held that 
the United States violated its
obligations "to enable Mexican consular 
offices to communicate with
and have access to their nationals," under 
the Convention.0
9 The ICJ
denied Mexico's request for annulment 
of the convictions and
sentences. However, it directed that U.S. 
courts give the death row
inmates effective "judicial review and reconsideration" 
of their convic-
tions and sentences in light of this failure, 
without applying procedu-
ral default rules to prevent consideration 
of the defendants' claims. 10
104 Id. art. 36(2).
105 Affidavit of Everard Kidder Meade V 
para. 7, Torres v. State, 2004 WL 3711623
(Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (No. PCD-04-442) 
[hereinafter Meade Affidavit].
106 See infra Part IV.B.2.i. (discussing 
the Mexican Capital Legal Defense
Program).
107 SeeAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 




108 Id. at 43.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 53, 60-61. The court reached 
its decision by a vote of fourteen to one.
Both the United States and Mexican judges 
voted with the majority. The Venezuelan
judge was the lone dissenter. This is not 
the result that would have been predicted 
by
some ICJ critics, who claim that national allegiance 
often trumps faithful adjudication
of international law. See Eric A. Posner 
& Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the Interna-





Medellin's attorneys returned to the U.S. 
courts with the ICJjudg-
ment in hand to renew their state and 
federal habeas claims. Texas
courts had previously denied Medellin's 
VCCR claim, and two federal
courts refused to overturn the rulings 
of the Texas courts."' The
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
ICJ's judgment in Avena, but held that 
it was precluded from giving
effect to the judgment by prior 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent
. ' 12
Because Medellin had not raised the 
VCCR claim at trial, the claim
was procedurally defaulted under the 
1996 amendments to the fed-
eral habeas statute
. ' 13 The Fifth Circuit further stated that 
the VCCR
does not serve to confer rights 
upon individuals.
1 4
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals regarding two 
questions:
1. In a case brought by a Mexican national 
whose rights were adjudi-
cated in the AvenaJudgment, must a court 
in the United States ap-
ply as the rule of decision, notwithstanding 
any inconsistent United
States precedent, the Avena holding that 
the United States courts
must review and reconsider the national's 
conviction and sentence,
without resort to procedural default doctrines?
2. In a case brought by a foreign national 
of a State party to the
Vienna Convention, should a court in the 
United States give effect
to the LaGrand [an earlier ICJ decision] 
and AvenaJudgments as a
matter of international judicial comity 
and in the interest of uni-
form treaty interpretation?
' 15
Prior to oral argument in the case, in 
a memorandum to the At-
torney General on February 28, 2005, 
President Bush directed state
courts to give effect to the ICJ ruling in 
Avena and to review the cases
of Medellin and the fifty other Mexican 
foreign nationals on death
row in the United States.11
6 Bush stated that he had determined 
"that
the United States will discharge its 
inter-national obligations under
111 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-CV-4078, 
slip op. at 1-4 (S.D. Tex. June 26,
2003).
112 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 
280 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed 544 
U.S.
660 (2005). The Fifth Circuit cited Breard 
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998), finding
that it "ruled that Vienna Convention 
claims, like Constitutional claims, can 
be proce-
durally defaulted, even in a death penalty 
case."
113 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(
2 ) (2000).
114 Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280 (citing 
United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 
F.3d 192,
198 (5th Cir. 2001)).
115 Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at *11, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 
660 (2005)
(No. 04-5928), 2004 WL 2851246.
116 Memorandum from George W. 
Bush, President of the United States, 
to the
U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
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the decision of the International Court ofJustice" and that it would do
so "by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity .... "117 While Bush appeared to be
conceding ICJ authority to interpret U.S. obligations under the
VCCR, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the VCCR a week later."" The executive memorandum to
review the cases is still in effect, but the withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol affects future disputes, reversing the earlier decision grant-
ing the ICJ decision-making authority over these disputes.
The Court heard argument in Medellin, but dismissed that case
on the grounds that certiorari had been improvidently granted. 1 9 The
effect of the ICJ decision, and the intervening effect of Bush's memo-
randum, were submitted and argued before the Texas Criminal Court
of Appeals, which has not issued an opinion as of this writing. 120 What
effect is to be given to the opinion and the memorandum is an inter-
esting question of law, but tangential to my main argument. These
are, in effect, the vertical processes that are less important-not en-
tirely unimportant, just less so-precisely because they can be shut off
by certain executive acts (e.g., withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the
ICJ in future disputes).
It is technically accurate that the issue before the Court in Medel-
lin was not the death penalty in the way that the death penalty was
directly challenged in Atkins and Roper (indeed, Sanchez-Llamas in-
volved noncapital convictions). But the story of how Medellin cases
came to be brought is centrally about the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States and the ways in which horizontal net-
works emerged to push the abolitionist agenda within U.S. courts.
B. Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law and Practice
Like many legal narratives, the story of the VCCR right to notifi-
cation and the death penalty in the United States is more complex
(and therefore more interesting) than this initial account of the verti-
cal integration of international law suggests. First, there is the obvious
gap in time between the United States acceding to the VCCR in 1969
and the rise of the VCCR defense in capital cases in the late 1990s.
117 Id.
118 See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, March 10,
2005, at Al (reporting on a letter sent by U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice to
UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicating that the United States was withdrawing
from the Optional Protocol).
119 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 667.




Why did it take thirty years for defense counsel to discover this failure
of notification as a potential defense to or basis of collateral attack in
criminal cases? 12' The answer to this question requires an examina-
tion of the behavior of the various actors whose interests converge
when foreign nationals are charged with capital crimes in the United
States. The surge of VCCR claims in capital cases occurred only after
the norm shift from international toleration of the death penalty to
abolition.
For many years, some persistent objectors to abolition of the
death penalty took the position that the death penalty should not
even be considered as subject to international interpretation and elab-
oration on the grounds it was within the U.N. Charter exception for
activities "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."' 22
At the time the ICCPR was being negotiated in 1950, states barely con-
sidered a complete international ban on the death penalty.1 - Like
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,124 the ICCPR
sought to protect the "right to life," but that right enumerated was
limited to protection only against arbitrary deprivations of life.12 5 The
European Charter of 1950 also expressly permitted the death penalty.
State sanctioned executions were lawful so long as certain procedural
rights were observed.
Nonetheless, a modern abolitionist movement began to emerge
in the late 1940s, and the several of the former fascist dictatorships,
including Germany, Austria and Italy abolished the death penalty.' 26
Abolitionism thus grew up outside of, but parallel to, the creation of
the regional and international human rights regimes in the post-war
121 Immigration attorneys discovered the VCCR earlier, because INS had adopted
regulations that required adherence to the notification provisions. See infra Part
111.11, for discussion of the early immigration cases.
122 William A. Schabas, International Law, Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 417, 420 (2004) (quoting U.N. Charter art.
2, para. 7).
123 U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess., 194th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
SR.194 (1950); ICCPR, supra note 24.
124 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of person." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
125 See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(1) ("Every human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.).
126 Schabas, supra note 122, at 419.
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period. 127 The language of the ICCPR on the question of the death
penalty reflected this parallel movement and suggested a program to-
ward abolition. Thus, while outright abolition was not achievable
when negotiations over the ICCPR began, by the time the ICCPR en-
tered into force in 1976, support for full abolition had grown. In ad-
dition to protecting arbitrary deprivations of life, the ICCPR provides:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sen-
tence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Cove-
nant .. . and can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.' 2s
The U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2857 in 1971,
which called for restricting the crimes for which the death penalty
would be available and recognized progressive abolition as a goal.1 29
International campaigns to abolish the death penalty stepped up
in the 1980s. In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was
adopted, outlawing the death penalty for persons below the age of
eighteen. 130 (The United States has not ratified the Convention, but
its provisions were discussed by the Court in the Roper case.131) Also
in 1989, Amnesty International published its groundbreaking survey
and analysis of the death penalty, Wen the State Kills.132 Amnesty re-
ported that only thirty-five countries were abolitionist for all crimes;
an additional eighteen countries were abolitionist for ordinary crimes;
another twenty-seven retained capital punishment on the books but
were abolitionist in practice. One hundred countries retained and
carried out the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The majority of
states continued to employ capital punishment, but momentum ap-
peared to be in the direction of abolition.' 33
127 See Koh, supra note 62, at 1094-95 (discussing the "de facto moratorium on the
death penalty that took effect throughout most of Western Europe" in the post-war
period).
128 ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(2).
129 G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(Dec. 20, 1971).
130 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3 (prohibiting executions for crimes committed under the age of eighteen).
131 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
132 AMNESTY INT'L., WHEN THE STATE KILLS (1989).
133 Schabas, supra note 122, at 421 (discussing Mhen the State Kills and noting that
"with each decade subsequent to 1948, the number of states abolishing capital punish-
ment increased").
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Formal legal efforts culminated with the adoption of Optional
Protocol 2 to the ICCPR in 1991, which banned the death penalty. 134
In addition, protocols to the European Convention on Human
Rights 35 and the American Convention on Human Rights 36 also out-
lawed the death penalty. The trend toward abolition in Latin America
appeared to gain momentum even earlier than in Europe. 137
The death penalty continued in the United States, with the nota-
ble exception of the period between 1967 and 1977 when a de facto
moratorium on capital punishment was in place. The moratorium re-
sulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia
38
striking down the death penalty statutes in forty states on the grounds
that they permitted unfettered jury discretion. - 9 It was not lifted un-
til the Gregg v. Georgia140 decision of 1976, when states reformed the
procedures and sentencing guidelines in a way the Court found to
meet constitutional minimums. 14 1 Popular support for capital punish-
ment in the United States had waxed and waned during the first de-
cades following World War II, reaching an all-time low of forty-two
percent in 1966, and resurging in the 1980s. 142 The resurgence was
assisted, in part, by a series of cases in which the Court laid out the
procedural protections under which the federal state could impose
death sentences and carry out executions.143 By 1989, thirty-seven
U.S. states retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes. 144
Throughout this period, the United States did not accede to any inter-
national obligations regarding limits upon capital punishment. When
134 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, 415.
135 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
136 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
4, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
137 A U.S. delegate to the San Jose Conference of 1969, at which the American
Convention was adopted, noted "'the general trend, already apparent, for the gradual
abolition of the death penalty."' Schabas, supra note 122, at 425 (quoting OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 10, at 9)).
138 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
139 Id. at 239 (striking down Georgia's death penalty statute on the basis of juries'
unfettered sentencing discretion and voiding the death penalty statutes of over forty
states).
140 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
141 Id. at 206-07 (reinstating the death penalty).
142 Koh, supra note 62, at 1095.
143 See, e.g., id. at 1099-1102 (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with the
death penalty to illustrate how the death penalty gained new life in the 1980s).
144 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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the United States did finally accede to the ICCPR in 1993, it did so
with reservations to every aspect of the treaty that would require it to
give the treaty provisions direct effect in U.S. courts and also limited
U.S. obligations regarding the death penalty to those that would be
required under the Eighth Amendment.145
What caused this international norm shift in the 1990s? The End
of the Cold War was an important catalyst. First, the end of the East-
West conflict promoted newly democratizing states to join western in-
stitutions and "lock-in" western human rights norms. The European
Human Rights Convention was amended to abolish the death penalty
in 1985.146 The states of the former Warsaw Pact, with an eye to join-
ing the European Union, were anxious to sign on to commitments to
the central human rights instruments of Europe that would serve as
entry into the club.
Second, just as the trend in Europe and elsewhere was toward
reinvigorating the possibility of real enforcement of core international
human rights norms, the United States seemed to be going backward,
taking a "law and order" attitude at home and an "exceptionalist" atti-
tude abroad. Even Bill Clinton, during his campaign for the presi-
dency in 1992, took time out to preside over the execution of a
mentally impaired death row inmate in Arkansas. 147 It cannot be
overestimated the extent to which American exceptionalism on capi-
tal punishment was a stone in the shoe of American global diplo-
macy.' 48 European allies, in particular, freed from the relational
constraints of the Cold War, were increasingly emboldened to con-
front the United States on this issue.
149
145 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Condi-
tional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 417 (2000).
146 See Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty art. 1, opened for signature Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into
force March 1, 1985).
147 See Christopher Olgiati, The Whitehouse Via Death Row, THE GJARDiAN, Features
p.18 (Oct. 12, 1993).
148 See Harold Hongju Koh & Thomas R. Pickering, American Diplomacy and the
Death Penalty, FoRErGN SERV. J., Oct. 2003, at 19; Schabas, supra note 122, at 434 (not-
ing international disagreements between the United Nations and the European
Union on one side and the United States on the other).
149 One example of these efforts was a 2001 symposium sponsored by the Council
of Europe and the Pan-European parliament aimed at a worldwide moratorium.
Texas was invited and attended part of the conference. John Quigley, International




At the same time, international and domestic NGOs had a win-
dow of opportunity to leverage both these trends-the momentum
created by new states signing on to the major international and re-
gional human rights treaties and the willingness of European states to
confront the United States. International organizations also played a
role by monitoring ongoing compliance with obligations and report-
ing on the persistent objectors like the United States and China. Be-
cause the United States had not obligated itself to a ban, these reports
tended to focus on the problems with fair application of the death
penalty in the United States. 150 Together with the work of domestic
abolition groups and legal organizations such as the ABA, a body of
empirical data was compiled suggesting that the death penalty in the
United States was applied disproportionately to African-Americans,
other minority groups, the poor, and the mentally impaired. 15 1
The trend toward abolition gained significant momentum in the
early 1990s. Since 1991, over fifty countries have acceded to Optional
Protocol 2; seventy countries are now bound by their accession to in-
ternational treaties banning the death penalty in all cases. Among the
countries that have not adopted a total ban, eleven countries limit the
death penalty to extreme crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
150 The 1997 Report of U.N. Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Waly
Ndiaye stated:
[I] remain[ ] deeply concerned that death sentences continue to be
handed down after trials which allegedly fall short of the international guar-
antees for a fair trial, including lack of adequate defence during the trials
and appeals procedures. [Areas of special concern are] the imposition and
application of the death penalty on persons reported to be mentally re-
tarded or mentally ill.... [and] those cases which were allegedly tainted by
racial bias on the part of the judges or prosecution and about the non-
mandatory nature of the appeals procedure after conviction in capital cases
in some states.
The Special Rapporteur, The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Viola-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular
Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories, para. 551, delivered to
the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60/ADD.1 (Dec. 24, 1996).
151 Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for "Racist" Use of Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A17; see also David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Find-
ingsfrom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1651 (1998) ("'While blacks make up
only thirteen percent of the nation's civilian population, blacks make up forty-one
percent of the nation's death row population."); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,
Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty,
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 434 (1995) (noting that a study of the death sentencing
in Harris County, Texas, "which has carried out more executions and sentenced more
people to death than most states," found that blacks were sent to death row nearly
twice as often as whites).
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high treason.1 52 The death penalty persists on the books and in prac-
tice in China, the Middle East, most parts of central and eastern Af-
rica, and the English-speaking Caribbean.'l Sixty-three countries
share the de jure U.S. position of retaining capital punishment for a
range of ordinary crimes, down from 100 in 1989.154 Of those coun-
tries, however, fewer than thirty have actually carried out executions
in the past decade. 155 During 2004, 3,797 people were executed in
twenty-five countries.1 56 Thus, with the prominent exceptions of
China, Iran, Vietnam and the United States, which together account
for 97% of the executions carried out in a year, the international
trend since 1990 has been toward both de facto and de jure aboli-
tion.' 57 Thirty-seven of the fifty U.S. states retain the death penalty, as
do the U.S. federal government and military.'
58
In the meantime, abolition has become the norm in the adminis-
tration of international and transitional justice. The death penalty
was not permitted as punishment under the 1994 statutes of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 59 nor is it per-
mitted under the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court.
160
In 2003, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Paul Bremer signed a
Coalition Provisional Authority decree suspending capital punishment
in Iraq.' 61 The death penalty was reinstated by the Iraqi government
152 Amnesty Int'l, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.




156 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty: 3,797 Executed in 2004 (Apr. 5,
2005), http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGACT500112005 Those countries were
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jor-
dan, North Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Su-
dan, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, United States, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. This
represents a downward trend in de facto execution rates. See Eric Prokosch, Human
Rights v. The Death Penalty: Abolition and Restriction in Law and Practice, AMNESTy INT'L,
May 13, 1998, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT500131998.
157 Id.
158 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 144.
159 See Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty Questions and Answers, at 2, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/abolish/dp-qa.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
160 See Amnesty Int'l, International Ciminal Court Excludes Death Penalty, DEATH P N.
ALrx NEWS, Sept. 1998, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT
530041998.





after the transfer of sovereignty from the CPA, and is an available pun-
ishment for convictions of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 62 Abolition has
not yet become a norm of customary international law, which requires
both consistent state practice and compliance with the practice out of
a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).'
6
3
For states that are parties to these international abolitionist obli-
gations, the illegality and immorality of the death penalty is a settled
matter. The persistence of the death penalty as a practice of a hand-
ful of states is thus seen by abolitionist states as an obstacle to be over-
come. In this way, the abolitionist movement reflects the dimension
of the international human rights regime in which states care about
the practices of other states. Abolitionist states take seriously their ob-
ligations not only to live up to the abolitionist standard, but to take
efforts to bring objecting states into the abolitionist fold, including
employing persuasion and coercion. Coercion is reflected through
the conditioning of membership or access to other club goods (such
as trade concessions or foreign aid) or direct retaliation by the use of
economic or security sanctions. The art of state persuasion can be
carried out through traditional diplomatic dialogue, the use of infor-
mation, and the invocation of liberal values.
The difficulty with American exceptionalism on the death penalty
is that, as the richest and most powerful nation in the world, coercion
is not a viable option for individual states. Moreover, attempts to act
as a block against the United States, as in the case of the EU, proves a
difficult collective action problem. The federal system of the United
States creates an additional obstacle to interstate coercion or persua-
sion. Many of the diplomatic counterparts at the national level may
be sympathetic to appeals to international abolitionist standards. But
the laws under which the death penalty is carried out and enforced
are, for the most part, laws of U.S. states.
Abolitionist states therefore required both a way to leverage their
individual objection to the death penalty practices of the United
States and a means of entry into the state and federal legal systems in
which capital sentences are sought, handed down, and enforced.
Consular notification and assistance would prove a relatively robust
method through which to accomplish both objectives.
162 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 27, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231.
163 Yet preeminent abolitionists see the trend of treaty accession and practice as
suggesting that this ripening into custom may occur in the near future. Schabas,
supra note 122, at 419.
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III. THE CONSULAR FUNCTION AS NORM MEDIATOR
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was drafted and
ratified to codify the customary international law that had grown up
over centuries of consular practice. Since the very first days of the
Republic, the United States has participated in the practice of sending
and receiving consuls, and the protection of the welfare and well-be-
ing of nationals has a long tradition as part of the consular func-
tion. 164 In contrast to diplomats, consular officers are not empowered
to deal with interstate political matters. 165 Rather, consuls tradition-
ally have been envoys serving in a foreign state or territory for the
purpose of protecting the direct commercial interests of the sending
state. This traditional role of consuls marchand (commercial consuls)
included within it the legal protection of individual nationals of the
sending state who might find themselves in a foreign territory in order
to carry out commerce.
166
The traditional view evolved over time, particularly as transporta-
tion methods advanced and personal and temporary business travel to
foreign states became easier' 67 Among the modern duties of a consu-
lar officer are the issuing of passports to nationals and visas to non-
nationals seeking to visit the sending state, performing legal functions
such as notarizing documents and assisting nationals who find them-
selves in distress while overseas.' 6s Prior to the adoption of the VCCR
as a multilateral treaty, bilateral consular conventions predomi-
nated. 169 By the 1950s, bilateral treaties commonly recognized consu-
164 For a history of the consular function during the first 130 years of the United
States, see CHARLES STUART KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN CONSUL (1990).
165 Diplomats may sometimes serve concurrently as consuls, in which case they
carry out political functions along with commercial and protective functions.
166 See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 124 (2d ed. 1991).
167 See id. (noting that the traditional consular function of protection "has as-
sumed growing importance as more and more people travel abroad-aided by re-
duced barriers to movement, cheaper transport, and the tourist and package-travel
industry").
168 The nature of the American consular service changed after World War I. See
KENNEDY, supra note 164, at 223 (noting how the duties of consuls changed during
WWI after they started to "oversee the evacuation of Americans from the war zone in
Europe, report on the fast-moving political and military developments, and represent
one or another of the belligerents as the neutral protecting power prior to the U.S.
entry into the war in 1917"). See generally U.S. Department of State, The Bureau of
ConsularAffairs, OurMission, http://travel.state.gov/about/mission/mission_307.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2006) (describing the duties of the Bureau of Consular Affairs:
issuing passports, providing support to U.S. citizens abroad, and issuing visas).
169 The United States was a party to twenty-two separate bilateral conventions





lar access (access by a consular officer of the 
sending state) to foreign
nationals (citizens of the sending state) 
who have been detained.
Some of these treaties detailed the right 
of a foreign consul to "inter-
view, communicate with, and advise any 
national" in the receiving
state, to visit any national "who is imprisoned 
or detained," and to be
"informed immediately by the appropriate 
authorities of the receiving
state when any national of the sending 
state is confined in prison
awaiting trial or otherwise detained in custody 
within his consular dis-
trict."1 70 Other bilateral treaties recognized 
a further sovereign right
of the sending state to "arrange for legal 
assistance" for detained na-
tionals as well as an individual right "at all 
times to communicate with
the appropriate consular officer."
1 71 In the bilateral treaties that ad-
dressed notification, it was mandatory. 
That is, the detained individ-
ual did not have the option to choose whether 
the consulate would be
notified; the receiving state was required 
to notify consular represent-
atives. The VCCR introduced a new dimension 
to consular assistance:
individuals are to be informed about consular 
notification, and, im-
portantly, are allowed the choice 
whether to notify the consulate.
1 72
A. Rationales for the Notification and Access 
Provision
Western democratic states with well-developed 
criminal justice
systems have generally agreed on the rationales 
for the notification
provision.' 7 3 Colin Warbrick, writing in 
the late 1980s about the role
of British consular officers, noted the importance 
of access to enable
the detainee to obtain local services, including 
lawyers for remand
prisoners and doctors for mental patients.
174 In short, the right of
consular office serves "[t]o minimize the 
disadvantages experienced
of Human Rights and Consular Protection 
in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 Hous. 
J.
INT'L L. 375, 387 (1997).
170 Consular Convention art. 15, U.S.-Costa 
Rica, Jan. 12, 1948, 1 U.S.T. 247, 264.
171 U.S.-U.KI Bilateral Consular Convention 
art. 15, June 6, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3426,
3439.
172 See discussion of VCCR Article 36 
at text accompanying supra notes 103-04.
173 During the negotiations on Article 36, 
the United States delegation noted that
no country should be allowed to disregard 
its obligation in certain circumstances to
inform consuls of the sending State 
of the arrest of its national. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.1
6 , at 10 (March 15, 1963). Italy added to 
this view by noting
that consuls would be prevented from 
discharging their basic protective functions
unless they were notified that one of their 
nationals had been arrested. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.1
7 , at 3 (March 17, 1963).
174 See Colin Warbrick, Protection of Nationals 
Abroad, 37 Iur'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1002,
1003 (1988).
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by accused foreigners," 175 which can include unfamiliarity with the
foreign language and legal system. Consular notification is also
viewed as an important measure to prevent maltreatment of a de-
tainee. When they are in the power and physical custody of a foreign
state, nationals may be most at risk of torture or inhuman treatment,
"for which ex post facto remedies are scarcely adequate." 176 A right of
access of third parties to persons in detention became viewed as an
important deterrent to such mistreatment. 177 Indeed, consular notifi-
cation has frequently been considered important to ensure not just
adequate treatment, but, in fact, better treatment than an individual
detainee would otherwise receive in the foreign system. 78 In the case
of disparate legal systems, the consular function serves to mediate be-
tween a mature criminal justice system (that of the sending state) and
a less mature foreign legal system with fewer general procedural pro-
tections or fewer protections for foreigners in which the national of
the sending state would be particularly vulnerable to unfair or une-
qual treatment.1
79
175 S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of
Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 719, 721 (1995); see also Uribe, supra note 169, at
387 ("Consular functions aim to protect the interests of the sending state and its
nationals.").
176 See Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 736; Uribe, supra note 169, at 395.
177 See Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 736-37.
178 Consular officers of the United States are required to visit American expatriate
prisoners on a regular basis. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSuAR NOTIFICATION AND
AcCESs 42 (1998) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://travel.
state.gov/pdf/CNA-book.pdf (noting that an important function of the consulate is
to provide "assistance to citizens who are detained by foreign government" by "visiting
them in prison to ensure that they are receiving humane treatment" (emphasis added)).
179 1 do not mean to suggest that all mature criminal justice systems within gener-
ally democratic countries have equal levels of procedural protections. Nor do I mean
to suggest that the criminal justice systems of the developed democracies are problem
free. The point here is that the consular function traditionally mediated between the
system of the sending state and the receiving state. The notification and access provi-
sions of the VCCR may be less compelling for a foreign national of a sending state
with an abysmal system of criminal procedural protection who finds herself in, for
example, Sweden. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 109TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: SWEDEN § 1 (c)-(e) (Comm. Print 2005), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41710.htm (noting that Sweden fully
complies with international protections against torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, has a fair and independent judiciary that guarantees fair trials,
and is a country where arbitrary arrests and detention generally do not occur). But
even Sweden, for all its advantages, is not perfect. Id. § 2(c) ("According to police




Already in the mid-1970s, the United States articulated its support
of these rationales for the notification provision of the VCCR. Article
36 was specifically cited as an essential tool for effective protection of
U.S. citizens abroad, one which served as a deterrent (though by no
means a perfect one) against abuse in countries with little to no pro-
tection from abuse within their criminal justice systems.18 0 Among
the particular concerns of the United States was the danger of co-
erced statements during detention.181 Arbitrary or draconian applica-
tion of the death penalty-particularly for less severe crimes which the
United States did not consider warranting capital punishment (for ex-
ample, drug smuggling) also raised the need for early consular notifi-
cation. The United States viewed the necessary leverage for protesting
bad practices and ultimately protecting individuals as emanating from
the early consular or diplomatic (i.e., political) intervention afforded
by notification. Diplomatic or political intervention is carried out al-
most exclusively by the Executive, but at least one recent high-profile
case involved direct intervention by a Senator.182
Consular notification thus holds out the promise of subsequent
extra protection of diplomacy and political interference. Although it
is never explicitly discussed in the legal analysis of the consular func-
tion, diplomatic interference is the dimension that is most salient to
Americans when they travel overseas. In the event of a miscarriage of
justice, many Americans believe that their own government will go to
extreme measures, throwing its reputation and clout behind their
cause until justice is served.' 8 3 Despite the occasional well-publicized
180 See U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional, Political, and Military Affairs, Part 2, 94th Cong. 6 (1975) (statement of Leonard
F. Walentynowicz, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that "a particular issue of prime impor-
tance is that of denied or delayed consular access," and that "[w]ith early access to
each prisoner we are convinced we can go a long way toward guaranteeing the pris-
oner against mistreatment and forced statements at the time of arrest" (emphasis added)).
181 Id.
182 Article 11 of the U.S. Constitution notes that the President shall receive ambas-
sadors and consuls. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3. The House and Senate often be-
come involved in high-profile cases. See, e.g., S. Res. 148, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REC.
18063-64 (1995) (discussing the arrest of Harry Wu, an American citizen and human
rights activist arrested on political charges in China). Releases of American citizens
held on political charges have been secured after sustained diplomatic pressure. See
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Frees U.S. Citizen Held Since April on Spy Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29. 2001, at A4; see also Jeff Leeds & Sharon Waxman, For a Music Maker in Hot
Water, Help From Friends in High Places, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at Al, B13 (detailing
the intervention of Senator Orrin Hatch to help secure the release of music producer
Dallas Austin from jail in Dubai, where he had been arrested for cocaine possession).
183 For an early example of where this did happen, see Meade v. United States, 76
U.S. 691, 693 (1869) (discussing the imprisonment in Spain of U.S. citizen Richard
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successful interventions, they are, in reality, the least likely outcome
for average Americans charged with ordinary crimes overseas, even
where the sentence for that crime might be harsher than it would be
in the United States.1
8 4
The rationales for notification and access went beyond these
practical considerations. The VCCR entered into force during a time
of increased legalization of international human rights. The aspira-
tional goals of the U.N. Charter'8 5 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 18 6 which set standards of treatment of individuals,
were supplemented by more formal human rights agreements such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ,187
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),' 88 the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Du-
ties of Man,189 and the European Convention on Human Rights Char-
ter. 90  These human rights instruments included provisions
protecting individuals facing criminal prosecution and also required
nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality. 91 Through incorpora-
tion into these multilateral human rights instruments, the fair treat-
ment of foreign nationals by one state became a concern not just of
the national's home state acting under its sovereign prerogative to ex-
tend protection to its citizens overseas, but of all members of the inter-
national community. Indeed, the codification of notification and
access under Article 36 of the VCCR was explicitly seen by some dele-
gates to the VCCR conference as part of the broader project to enu-
merate and codify human rights protections. The delegate from
Greece, for example, noted that by incorporating the right of notifica-
Meade in 1816 who was "finally released only by reason of the active interposition of
the government of the United States in his behalf").
184 See, e.g., 48 Hours Mystery: Lori Berenson Speaks, (CBS television broadcast Oct.
19, 2000), available at http://cbsnews.com/stories/2000/10/18/48hours/main2421
75.shtml (describing the background of Lori Berenson, an American sentenced to life
in a Peruvian prison after being convicted of involvement with a terrorist group).
185 U.N. Charter art. 1.
186 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 124.
187 ICCPR, supra note 24.
188 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976).
189 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.
Official Rec., OEA/Ser./L./V./I.23, doc. 21 rev. 6.
190 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 135, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 228; id. art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 232.
191 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental




tion and access into the treaty, the conference was "following the pre-
sent-day trend of promoting and protecting human rights, for which
future generations would be grateful."'
92
In 1985, the U.N. General Assembly adopted "The Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live,"'19 which provides, in part, that "laIny
alien shall be free at any time to communicate with the consulate or
diplomatic mission of the State of which he or she is a national."1 94
This declaration merged the norm of nondiscrimination against for-
eign nationals found in the central human rights treaties with the no-
tification provisions of the VCCR and customary international law. As
a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration is not binding as a
matter of international law, but it succeeds in refraining the notifica-
tion right as one of an individual right of the foreign national. By
reading the declaration together with the VCCR, it is possible to con-
clude, as Warbrick did, that the "interest of the individual in consular
protection is, in some of its aspects, a personal right and not a matter
of concern only to the two States." 19
5
By the late 1980s, the notification and assistance requirement of
Article 36 became viewed as supplemented by other international
human rights standards, in particular, by ICCPR Article 14, which de-
tails the criminal procedure protections owed individuals. The ICCPR
thus served to give content to the rights understood to constitute the
"international minimum standard" of treatment required for foreign
nationals. 196 This view of the consular function thus signaled a subtle
shift from the traditional view as mediating between two sovereigns-
i.e., between the legal system of the sending state and that of the re-
ceiving state-toward mediation between an international standard
and that of the receiving state.
Despite the practical and human rights-based rationales of consu-
lar intervention that underlie the notification and access provisions, as
Warbrick notes, "nowhere is there an indication that the individual
192 See 1 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, 2d Comm., 17th mtg. at 339,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 (Mar. 15, 1963) (remarks of the Greek delegate, Mr.
Spyridakis).
193 G.A. Res. 40/144, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Dec. 13, 1985). The General Assembly
later adopted standards applicable to all individuals facing detention. Body of Princi-
ples for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 1988).
194 G.A. Res. 40/144, supra note 193, art. 10.
195 Warbrick, supra note 174, at 1004.
196 Id. (citing Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law
1986, 57 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 487, 605 (1986)).
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has a right to demand that his consulate takes steps to visit him and
secure services for him."' 97 Rather, to the extent that an individual
right is created by the notification and access requirement, it is a right
fully contingent on the decision of the sending state to maintain a
consular presence and also the willingness or ability of the consul of
the sending state to accept the notification and render assistance. It
cannot, for example, be compared to the right to counsel in the
United StatesA98 Unlike the provision of counsel in the oft-recited
Miranda statement, if a consul is not available, none will be provided
to the foreign detainee. 199 Consular representation-and thus the in-
tervention on which the rationales for notification are premised-re-
mains an expression of the sovereign prerogatives of the sending
state .200
B. Enforcement and Remedies
Given the contingent nature of the right, it is thus not terribly
surprising that state signatories barely contemplated the possibility of
a judicial remedy in cases of a failure to notify. Judicial enforcement
of individual rights created under the VCCR is not directly mentioned
in the travaux prparatoires (negotiating history) of the Convention.
20 1
The U.S. State Department's view was that enforcement of the rights
and obligations created under the treaty rested primarily with the
197 Id.
198 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (deciding that indigent
defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed to him
or her).
199 In practice, this can be a real problem for nationals of poor countries who find
themselves in countries with little or no consular representation.
200 Several countries have adopted national legislation that requires their consular
officers to render assistance. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) ("Whenever it is made
known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly de-
prived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the
duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such im-
prisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of Ameri-
can citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the
release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release . . . ") (emphases ad-
ded); Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.).
201 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imus
judgment__20040331.pdf (describing how the United States disagreed with the notion
that the VCCR required a judicial remedy for a failure of immediate notification and
that "such an understanding was supported neither by the terminology, nor by the
object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by its travaux priparatoires").
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state signatories and that remedies were 
limited to diplomacy or inter-
state dispute resolution; the treaty did not 
create a judicially cogniza-
ble individual right.
2 0 2 Moreover, the U.S. view reflected a 
broad
international consensus.
203 During the period 1969-1989, none 
of
the state parties to the VCCR took the 
position that judicially cogniza-
ble rights were created 
under the treaty.
20 4
Because the VCCR was ratified by the 
Senate as a self-executing
treaty, no subsequent legislation was 
necessary to give it full legal ef-
fect within the United States.
20 5 Congress did not pass any legislation
that would provide specific guidance 
requiring federal law enforce-
ment agents to follow Article 36.206 
The State Department continued
to issue guidance to consular officers overseas 
about the scope of their
duty to assist American citizens.
207 The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) adopted a rule in 1979 
that required INS officials to
comply with Article 36 when detaining 
foreign nationals.
20° The De-
202 See State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 
P.3d 573, 579 (2005) (noting that the 
conclu-
sion that the VCCR does not create an individual 
right is "confirmed by the fact that,
since at least 1970, the State Department 
has maintained that the VCCR does 
not
create enforceable individual rights").
203 The record of the conference 
contains no discussion of justiciability 
of the
right of notification. There are, however, 
several references by delegates to the 
VCCR
as a means to protect "individual" 
rights. See, e.g., 1 U.N. Conference 
on Consular
Relations, 2d Comm., 16th mtg. at 
337, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/1
6 (Mar. 15, 1963)
(quoting U.S. delegation, speaking 
in support of proposed amendment 
to require
notification only at the informed request 
of the detainee and explaining that 
the
purpose of Article 36, as eventually 
adopted, was to benefit the detainee 
and "to pro-
tect the rights of the national concerned").
204 See Counter-Memorial of the 
United States, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. 
v. U.S.),
2000 I.C.J. Pleadings 64-68 (Mar. 
27), paras. 76, 97.
205 See S. ExEc. REP. No. 91-9, app. 
at 5 (1969) (statement by Deputy Legal 
Adviser
J. Edward Lyerly) (describing how the 
treaty was "entirely self-executive [sic] 
and does
not require any implementing or complementing 
legislation"); see also REsTATEMENT
(TIRD) oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 
pt. 1, ch. 2, intro. n. at 41 (1987) 
(noting that
"[u]nder the Supremacy Clause, self-executing 
treaties concluded by the United
States become law ... as of the time 
they come into force for the United 
States"); id.
§ 111 (3) (describing how a "'
n on -self-e
x e cuting agreement' will not be given effect 
as
law in the absence of necessary implementation").
206 See infra text accompanying note 
426.
207 See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS MANuA. §§ 420-22 (2004), 
availa-
ble at http://foia.state.gove/regs/search.asp 
(describing the importance of gaining
access to a citizen arrested abroad).
208 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1979). The 
instructions required the INS office 
to inform
the detained national of the fight 
to consular notification. Id.; see also 
Shank &
Quigley, supra note 175, at 738 ("Apart 
from the immigration instructions, 
no other
federal administrative directive pertaining 
to consular access for foreigners in 
the
United States exists."). This included 
no instructions to Department of Justice 
attor-
neys and United States Attorney's 
offices regarding the notification 
provisions. By
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partment of'Justice and the military had adopted consular notification
guidelines prior to the VCCR and updated them subsequent to the
adoption of the VCCR. 209 None of these regulations provided specifi-
cally for judicial review, beyond what would otherwise be available
through the administrative review process.2 10 At the state and munici-
pal level, there was a general lack of administrative guidance on the
notification provisions for law enforcement personnel. Police training
on procedures did not include training on the VCCR.21t State and
local police forces thus operated in blissful ignorance of the require-
ment, with the result that noncompliance was widespread. 21 2
The Optional Protocol of the VCCR did, however, provide for the
adjudication of interstate disputes arising between state signatories
before the ICJ. Until the Breard case in 1998,213 jurisdiction of the ICJ
to decide a case under the VCCR had been invoked only once, in the
case of the taking of American hostages in Tehran in 1979.214 Cur-
rently, 172 states are signatories to the VCCR.2 15 And yet there have
been only four applications, including Breard, brought under the Op-
contrast, the U.K. by the mid-1990s had "issued instructions to police that detained
foreigners, regardless of their states of nationality, 'may communicate at any time'
with their consulate and that they must be asked if they wish the police to inform their
consulate of their detention." Id. at 738 (citation omitted).
209 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (1999); see also Mark Warren, Consular Notification:
Statutory and Regulatory Provisions, July 2006, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/
compliance.htm (referencing a 1983 FBI manual).
210 See 8 CFR § 242.2(e) (1979); Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 738.
211 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 739. To be sure, police and law enforce-
ment officials permitted detainees to contact someone. Detainees who were aware of
the right to consular access could contact their consulates and police did not gener-
ally interfere with those subsequent contacts and communications. Id. But it was no
substitute for the police informing the foreign national of the right, which may have
the additional value of placating any fears on the part of the detainee that contact
with the consulate would be construed as hostile by the police. Id.
212 See id. at 748.
213 See infra Part IV.B.4.i. (discussing Breard).
214 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, paras. 45-47, at 24-26 (May 24).
215 See VCCR, supra note 2, art. 79.
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tional Protocol to challenge state violations of the VCCR.216 Each of
these cases raised Article 36 concerns.
217
Enforcement of the VCCR was therefore largely carried out
through classic interstate diplomacy. Violations of the treaty typically
were raised by the sending state to the foreign ministry of the receiv-
ing state through formal channels, such as presentation of a diplo-
matic note.218 For the United States, monitoring of compliance with
the notification provision abroad, for example, was and continues to
be carried out by State Department representatives. 21 9 Similarly, for-
eign states with consular representation in the United States typically
lodge their complaints with the Department of State. 220 To the extent
that the State Department provides a "remedy" for failure of enforce-
ment by federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, it might be
through a formal apology and assurance to the foreign state that steps
would be taken to ensure compliance in the future. 221
Given the view of the signatory states that, while the notification
requirement serves to protect individuals, it can only be enforced be-
tween states, it is not surprising that few individual VCCR claims were
raised in U.S. courts in the first two decades the treaty was in force.
Between 1966 and 1994, the VCCR was directly invoked in only
nineteen reported state and federal cases; none of them raised a claim
216 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 1.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imusimusjudgment-20040331 .pdf; LaGrand
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); U.S. Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. The
ICJ has also addressed individual rights under a bilateral consular treaty. See Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176, at
178 (Aug. 27).
217 See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376; Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 17 (noting how "Mexico based
the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36"); LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 470 ("Germany
based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36."); U.S. Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 6
(noting that the U.S. government requested that the ICJ "adjudge and declare as
follows: ... that the Government ... of Iran... violated its international legal obliga-
tions to the United States as provided by . .. Articles 5 [and] 36").
218 See LEE, supra note 166, at 93-95.
219 See M. Wesley Clark, Providing Consular Rights Warnings to Foreign Nationals, FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., March 2002, at 22, 25, (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a) (1), (a) (3)
(2006)), available at http://www.fbi.gov/puhlications/leb/2002/marO2leb.pdf. Clark
notes that while 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 discusses consular notification in cases of arrest, it
fails to require that notification be made in the case of detention not constituting
arrest. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.173
(2005).
220 See LEE, supra note 166, at 62-63; STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 178, at
18.
221 Counter-Memorial of the U.S., supra note 204, para. 50; see infra Part IV.C.
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under Article 36.222 Several cases were, however, brought under the
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations governing depor-
tation of foreign nationals. 22 3 In one of those cases, the court held
222 Many of these cases considered questions of consular immunity. Federal cases:
Gerritsen v. Consulado General De Mexico, 989 F.2d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that consul and vice-consul were entitled to immunity under VCCR in § 1983
claim); Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that VCCR
provides consular officials with immunity in a suit brought by a father whose children
were taken to Norway in violation of a U.S. court order); Gerritsen v. de la Madrid
Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that wrongful acts committed
by officials and employees were not consular functions and so did not qualify for
immunity under VCCR); DuPree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that consul did not have standing to intervene under VCCR in a suit filed by
Mexican nationals against United States); United States v. Wilburn, 497 F.2d 946, 948
(5th Cir. 1974) (holding that under VCCR, vice consul can be called as a witness and
to elect to testify or produce requested documents); Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445
F.2d 501, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that consul should be granted immunity
under VCCR in civil action based on a public act concerning diplomatic activity);
Ford v. Clement, 834 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting immunity to consul-
general under VCCR in defamation suit by former vice-consul); United States v. Cole,
717 F. Supp. 309, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that consul-general was not enti-
ded to immunity under VCCR for money laundering); Koeppel & Koeppel v. Fed.
Republic of Nigeria, 704 F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that consul was
immune from suit for providing a foreign national with refuge after he allegedly
started a fire). State cases: In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 712-13 (Cal. 1994) (rais-
ing notice requirement in guardianship cases under the VCCR); People v. Corona,
259 Cal. Rptr. 524, 531-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that defendant not entitled
to post-conviction relief for improper admission of consul testimony without waiver of
consular immunity privilege); Silva v. Super. Ct., 125 Cal. Rptr. 78, 86 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that consul only afforded immunity for official consular matters); Ill.
Commerce Comm'n v. Salamie, 369 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (forcing
honorary consul for another nation to testify to matters not in relation to his func-
tions as honorary consul); Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Mass.
1983) (holding that consular officer was immune under VCCR for altercation that
occurred during exercise of consular functions); Republic of Argentina v. City of New
York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 704 (N.Y. 1969) (exempting premises owned by foreign consul
from municipal real-estate taxes); Cocron v. Cocron, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797, 805 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975) (holding that consular officials are only immune from civil suits in relation
to official consular matters). For a rare pre-VCCR case on consular notification, see
United States v. Coplon, 89 F. Supp. 664, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (examining a pre-trial
motion challenging unreasonable delay in providing consular notification).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra, 3 F.3d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Zaleta-Sosa, 854 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799
F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52
(9th Cir. 1982); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 82 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas,
617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Arango-Chairez, 875 F. Supp. 609, 616 (D. Neb. 1994);
United States v. Floulis, 457 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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that the INS regulation-not the treaty itself-created a personal
right.
224
The original purpose of the consular function, reflecting the de-
sire to strengthen the sovereign prerogative of the sending state to
choose to protect its nationals and mediate between the legal system
of the receiving state and the home country, or to choose not to pro-
tect its nationals at all, was preserved and strengthened by the VCCR
regime. The extent to which the VCCR could serve to mediate be-
tween the legal system in which a foreign national found himself and
the norms of external systems (whether international or that of the
sending state) was limited by confining remedies to interstate dispute
resolution. The effectiveness of outside consular intervention to alter
legal outcomes in particular cases depended as much on the political
power of the sending state vis-A-vis the receiving state as it did on the
legal requirements of the convention. But by the 1990s, the increased
legalization of the international human rights regime, combined with
the trend toward the abolition of the death penalty, resulted in a new,
more robust VCCR notification requirement that could be exploited
by transnational advocacy support networks to affect the actual out-
comes in capital cases of foreign nationals.
IV. DEFENDANT "ZERO" AND THE NoRM CASCADE
This evolution of consular notification as an expression of sover-
eign prerogative and a mechanism of mediation between two legal
systems to its use as a formal portal through which external human
rights norms could enter into a legal system, be elaborated, consid-
ered, and ultimately affect outcomes in particular cases, required a
defendant "zero." That initial defendant would be the first foreign
national to raise the claim of a judicially cognizable individual right
arising from the notification provision of VCCR and challenge the de-
nial of consular notification as an infringement on protections from
arbitrary and unfair application of the death penalty.
The first case brought under the Article 36 notification provisions
of the VCCR was not a criminal case. In United States v. Calderon-Me-
dina,22 5 the INS detained a Mexican national for deportation on the
grounds that his immigration status was irregular. The INS failed to
224 United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that "[t]he right established by the regulation and in this case by treaty is a personal
one," while emphasizing "the purpose of the treaty which the [INS] regulation imple-
ments, namely to promote assistance to aliens from officials of their country of
origin").
225 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
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inform the Mexican national of his right, under INS regulations, to
have the consulate notified of his detention and ordered him de-
ported. The Mexican national appealed the order on the basis of the
failure to notify him of his right to contact the consulate. On remand
back from the Ninth Circuit for a determination of facts, 22 6 the dis-
trict court held that the deportation was not precluded by due pro-
cess. In a companion case, the Ninth Circuit set forth a test for
nullification of deportation orders where there was a failure to notify
under the regulations implementing Article 36: "(1) the man did not
know of his right to contact a consul; (2) he would have contacted a
consul had he known of his right; and (3) consular assistance might
have improved his chance of avoiding deportation." 227 On the evi-
dence before it, the court voided the deportation order. While this
case was not brought in a capital case, the reasoning of the court
would prove important to later claims.
A. Faulder v. State228
Defendant "zero" was a Canadian national named Joseph Stanley
Faulder.229 Faulder was convicted in Texas state court of a murder
that took place in 1975 and was sentenced to death. 230 At the time of
his arrest, he was not notified of his right to contact the Canadian
consulate. 23 1 Significantly, Faulder presented no mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase of his trial.2 52 In September 1991, Sandra
226 Id. at 532.
227 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 731 (citing Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at
533) (discussing disposition of Calderon-Medina on remand from court of appeals).
228 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996).
229 For a description of the case from his defense counsel, see Babcock, supra note
62, at 374-77. See also Mark Warren, Foreword to YINC-JEN Lo, HUMAN RIGHTS LTIGA-
TION PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. CouRTs, at xiii-xiv (2005). Warren is a
Canadian volunteer for Amnesty International who assisted Sandra Babcock in the
Faulder defense. Babcock, supra note 62, at 377 n.37. He is also the creator and
author of the Web resource Foreign Nationals, Consular Assistance and the Death
Penalty, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/.
230 Faulder, 81 F.3d at 517. Among the procedural twists and turns of Faulder's
case was a reversal of his first conviction by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
the basis that the admission of Faulder's confession taken in violation of the Fifth
Amendment was in error. Id. at 517 (citing Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979)). The second conviction was obtained through testimonial evi-
dence of an accomplice. Id.
231 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375. Canada maintained a consulate in Dallas, just
hours from the place of Faulder's incarceration.
232 His attorneys would later claim that mitigating testimony would have been
available, had his family even been aware of the legal proceeding against him. Id.




Babcock, a staff attorney at the Texas 
Resource Center, an organiza-
tion which provided post-conviction relief 
(primarily through federal
habeas proceedings) for indigent capital 
defendants, took charge of
Faulder's appeals.
233 Sometime after Babcock filed the state 
habeas
claim in 1992, an officer of the Canadian 
consulate informed her
about the existence of the VCCR and 
encouraged her to look into
whether the treaty might have applicability 
in Faulder's case.
23 4 Bab-
cock amended her state habeas petition 
to include a claim based on
Texas' failure to timely notify the Canadian 
consulate of Faulder's ar-
rest.2 35 The trial court denied the 
habeas petition and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed the denial.
236
A VCCR claim was subsequently raised 
in Santana v. State,
237 in
which a national of the Dominican Republic 
was convicted of murder
in Texas and sentenced to death.
238 There, the failure to notify claim
was not raised at trial but was raised 
shortly before his scheduled exe-
cution.239 The Texas court refused to 
rule on the VCCR challenge on
the ground that it could not confirm 
that the Texas authorities knew
that Santana was a Dominican national.
2 40 The government of the
Dominican Republic filed a petition with 
the Inter-American Commis-
relatives. In its subsequent rejection 
of habeas on the grounds that the VCCR 
viola-
tion did not constitute prejudice, the 
court relied on "the fact that Faulder 
main-
tained from the time of his arrest that 
he had no desire to contact his family 
in
Canada." Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 
741, 741 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999).
233 John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, 
Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging 
Impor-
tance of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations as a Defense Tool, CRiMpION,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 28, 28. Interestingly, 
a student note published in February 
1994
discussed the Faulder case, and made 
the first argument in the American legal 
litera-
ture that state law enforcement practices 
should conform with the obligations 
of the
VCCR and that failure to notify should 
form the basis of review of criminal 
convic-
tions. Gregory Dean Gisvold, Note, Strangers 
in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of
Foreign Nationals Arrested in the United States 
by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. 
L.
REv. 771, 777-78 (1994).
234 Sims & Carter, supra note 233, at 
28.
235 Id.
236 Appellant's Brief at 3, Faulder, 
178 F.3d 741 (No. 99-20542).
237 714 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
238 Adele Shank, a capital litigator, 
worked on the Santana appeals in late 
1992
and early 1993. E-mail from Sandra Babcock, 
Associate Professor of Law, Northwest-
ern University, to Margaret E. McGuinness, 
Associate Professor of Law, University 
of
Missouri-Columbia (Sept. 18, 2006) (on 
file with author).
239 The Dominican Republic did maintain 
consular offices in the United States 
at
the time of Santana's trial and Dominican 
law did require consular officers to assist
detained Dominican nationals. See 
Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, 
at 723 &
nn.18-20 (citing Application for Post-Conviction 
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12-13, Ex
parte Santana, No. 68,930 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Mar. 19, 1993)).
240 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, 
at 746.
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sion on Human Rights (IACHR) challenging the failure of the United
States to provide a remedy for the VCCR violation.241 The Commis-
sion issued a provisional measure requesting that Texas delay the exe-
cution of Santana pending hearing the case. Texas did not stay the
execution, and Santana was executed as scheduled in 1993.242 Al-
though the decision in Santana was reached prior to the adjudication
of the claim in Faulder, because Santana was not believed to be a for-
eign national at the time of his arrest, his case represented a kind of
false start.
In Faulder, Babcock raised the VCCR claim in a collateral federal
case seeking habeas corpus relief.243 Texas admitted that the Cana-
dian consulate had not been notified at the time of Faulder's arrest.
24 4
In reviewing the district court's denial of habeas relief, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that there had, in fact, been a violation of Faulder's rights
under the VCCR, noting that the Convention "requires an arresting
government to notify a foreign national who has been arrested, im-
prisoned or taken into custody or detention of his right to contact his
consul," and that "Canadian regulations require the Canadian consul
to obtain case-related information if requested by the arrestee. '"2
45
The court nonetheless denied relief to Faulder on the basis that
"Faulder and Faulder's attorney had access to all of the information
that could have been obtained by the Canadian government," and was
therefore "merely the same as or cumulative of evidence defense
counsel had or could have obtained."246 The Fifth Circuit denied re-
lief and a subsequent request for rehearing en banc and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 2
47
241 Id., at 746-47 & n.153 (citing Individual Complaint to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Against the United States of America on behalf of
Carlos Santana, Case 11.130, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1993)).
242 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 747 (noting that a petition to the IACHR
was also filed in Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
243 In addition to the VCCR violation, Faulder requested relief on the grounds
that the use of special, private prosecutors violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, that the chief witness testified falsely in violation of the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court had
denied relief to Faulder, but issued the required certificate of probable cause re-
quired to appeal the denial of habeas. Id.
244 Id. at 520.
245 Id. (citing the VCCR, supra note 2).
246 Id.
247 Appellant's Brief, supra note 236, at 4. Two subsequent state habeas challenges
were brought based on the use of the private state prosecutors and the ground that
state clemency procedures violated due process. Id. at 5-6.
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In 1999, twenty-two years after Faulder was put on death row and
after two subsequent state habeas appeals were denied, 24 Faulder's
attorneys went back to federal court and brought suit under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) 249 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.250 The suit included two
claims: First, that living through nine execution dates and repeated
stays of execution amounted to psychological torture that was a viola-
tion of his constitutional rights within the meaning of § 1983 and also
represented a violation of the Torture Convention, 251 which is the
"law of nations" within the meaning of the ATS;2 52 and second, that
the failure of consular notification violated the VCCR and was thus
also a tort within the meaning of the ATS.253 The first claim was dis-
missed on the grounds that neither § 1983 nor the ATS provided an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act 254 restrictions on the ability of
federal courts to enjoin state proceedings. 255 The district court fur-
ther denied Faulder's request for a temporary restraining order on
the grounds that the underlying claim of psychological torture under
the Eighth Amendment and the Torture Convention had been held
not to create grounds for relief on the basis of the psychological im-
pact of stays of execution and the drawing out of time on death
row.2 56 The court rejected the second claim as barred by collateral
estoppel on the ground it had been actually litigated and decided in
the earlier Fifth Circuit habeas opinion.2 57 The district court noted in
dicta, however, that it disagreed with the defendant's claim that viola-
tions of the VCCR do not create an individual right.258 The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit's earlier opinion in Faulder was premised
248 Id.
249 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
250 Faulder v. Johnson, 99 F. Supp. 2d 774, 775 (S.D. Tex, 1999).
251 Convention Against Torture, supra note 25.
252 Faulder, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (quoting 28 U,S.C. § 1350).
253 Id. at 775.
254 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
255 Faulder, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 776. The court rejected Faulder's claim that his
§ 1983 claim fell within one of the expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. Id. at 776-78.
256 Id. at 777 (citing White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996)). In White, the
Fifth Circuit found that claims under both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention
would fail, in that the United States signed reservations to both treaties that limited
their protection to whatever treatment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. White, 79
F.3d at 439.
257 Fauder, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
258 Id.
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on the ability to assert an individual right,25 9 and also that the Ninth
Circuit had held that the VCCR created an individual right.260
On June 16, 1999, the Fifth Circuit denied Faulder's appeal from
the district court's dismissal.2 6' Faulder was executed the next day.2 6 2
Canada had requested a list of all Canadian nationals on Texas'
death row every year of the first fourteen that Faulder was on death
row, but Faulder's name never appeared on the list.263 Once they
were informed of Faulder's incarceration and death sentence (which
they learned from Babcock in 1992), the Canadian government, pub-
lic at large, and individual Canadian advocates became involved in
efforts to commute his sentence.264 The federal habeas petition in-
cluded affidavits and testimony from witnesses in Canada in his sup-
port, along with an amicus brief filed by the Government of
Canada.26 5 Delegations of Canadian parliamentarians met with the
Texas Pardons Board. 266 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy
met personally with Secretary of State Madeline Albright and re-
quested that she intervene in the case. 267 Albright's only intervention
in the case occurred in November 1998, following one of the many
stays of Faulder's execution date, in the form of a letter to then-Gover-
nor George W. Bush in which she noted the importance of consular
notification to the protection of American citizens abroad, adding
that, while it was the position of the United States Government that
Faulder was not entitled to a judicial remedy, the circumstances of the
failure of notification in his case might warrant the political solution
of clemency relief.268 Bush denied clemency, but the federal govern-
259 Id.
260 Id. (citing Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999)).
261 Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1999).
262 Death Penalty Information Center, Confirmed Foreign Nationals Executed
Since 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=582#exe-
cuted (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
263 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375.
264 Id. at 375-76.
265 Id. at 375. The Canadian government had also filed briefs in support of
Faulder in his state proceedings. Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 376 (quoting Letter from Madeleine K Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, to
George W. Bush, Governor, State of Tex. (Nov. 27, 1998)). Albright noted specifically




ment set the stage for an eventual outcome it explicitly did not sup-
port: judicial remedy.
2 69
Canada did not neglect the potential "vertical" legal processes
available to it. Following his final stay of execution during the pursuit
of remedies in Texas and federal court, Faulder filed a petition with
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) "arguing that
Texas had subjected him to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"
in violation of the Torture Convention, the ICCPR and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 27 0 The gravamen of this
complaint is known as the "death row phenomenon," the idea that
mere presence of death row and the uncertainty of the ultimate time
of death represents a unique psychological trauma on the inmate.
2 71
The IACtHR issued precautionary measures requesting the United
States to stay the execution pending resolution of his claim. 27 2 That
request was ignored and Faulder was executed.2 73
The press played a significant role in the nongovernmental
processes. Editorials ran in the major U.S. and Canadian papers sup-
porting commutation of Faulder's death sentence. 274 The abolitionist
network, which has developed excellent domestic organizational capa-
bilities, inundated the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles with over
4,000 letters supporting commutation. 275 As Faulder's attorney noted,
all of the separate and concerted governmental, NGO and private acts
that took place to prevent Faulder's execution failed in one important
regard: Texas executed Faulder.2 76 But the broader effects of the case
were felt in Canada, where public support for the death penalty
dropped following the last stay of Faulder's execution in 1998.277
269 Faulder's attorney subsequently discovered that some members of the Texas
Pardons Board had voted without reviewing the letter from Albright, which became
the basis for a challenge to the clemency decision. Id. at 377.
270 Id. at 376.
271 Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deon-
tology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766 n.147 (2005).
272 Babcock, supra note 62, at 377.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 375. See, e.g., Editorial, Gallows Watch: Canadian's Death Sentence Should Be
Commuted to Life, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 15, 1999, at 12A; Editorial, Stan
Faulder's Execution, TORONTO STAR, June 18, 1999, at ed. 1; Paul Stanway, Faulder Execu-
tion Doesn't Make Case, CALGARY SuN, June 20, 1999, at C6; Editorial, Texas and Interna-
tional Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1998, at A28 (arguing that the Texas Pardons Board
should commute Faulder's death sentence to life in prison).
275 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375.
276 Id. at 377.
277 Id. (citing Janice Tobbetts, Support for Death Penalty Falls, MoTrEAL GAZETTE,
Dec. 31, 1998, at A3).
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Also significant in this narrative of norm transfer is that, in the
1996 case, the Fifth Circuit adopted Babcock's framing of the VCCR
notification provision as a right belonging to the criminal defendant
thus providing a basis for challenge to all criminal convictions in
which the right was denied.2 78 The challenge for criminal defendants
was coming up with ways in which denial of the right would rise to the
level of a violation of well-settled criminal due process, such as volun-
tariness of confessions and the right to effective assistance of counsel
that could be raised in direct appeals or collateral challenges. These
avenues of argument remain open post-Sanchez-Llamas.
What is unusual in this case is that the spark igniting the "discov-
ery" of the VCCR came from a traditional state actor, the government
of Canada, interacting with a domestic criminal defense attorney.2 79
In some ways, the story of the VCCR and the death penalty follows the
traditional narrative of the consular function for expatriates in foreign
lands. The consular function serves to mediate between the domestic
legal system (here, a Canadian system in which the death penalty was
illegal and no executions had been carried out since 1962280), and the
foreign system (the criminal justice system of the State of Texas which
executed thirty-seven prisoners in 1997281) which the national govern-
ment does not fully control. But it does so in a nontraditional way.
The groups that are traditionally considered "norm entrepre-
neurs" in international human rights-the well-established transna-
tional NGOs and high-profile legal academics-became involved after
the spark from the government of Canada and their work, in turn,
further energized the official position of Canada. Amnesty Interna-
tional was actively involved in Faulder's case starting in spring 1992,
supporting Babcock with governmental lobbying, publicity and re-
search. 282 The Canadian government was actively engaged in tradi-
tional diplomatic appeals to the U.S. government and explicitly
sought clemency. 28 3 Only after concerted lobbying by NGOs and aca-
278 Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).
279 Sims & Carter, supra note 233, at 28.
280 Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty in Canada: Twenty Years of Abolition (Apr.
2000), http://www.amnesty.ca/deathpenalty/canada.php. The death penalty was
abolished in Canada by an Act of Parliament in 1976. It was retained for only extreme
military crimes until 1998 when it was removed from the National Defense Act. No
military execution had taken place since the late 1940s. The last civilian execution
took place in Canada in 1962. Id.
281 Tex. Dep't of Justice, Texas State Executions by Year (Sept. 13, 2006), http://
www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm.




demics did the government of Canada agree to engage in legal ac-
tions, such as filing amicus briefs.
2 4
The consular function was not the only way in which a formal
procedural mechanism had served to mediate between U.S. and Cana-
dian law on the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Canada in 2001
cited what it perceived to be the arbitrary application of the death
penalty in the United States in an opinion refusing extradition of per-
sons sought in the United States on capital charges. 285 Up to that
point, Canada had been willing to extradite individuals found in Ca-
nadian territory who were wanted on capital charges in the United
States, 286 even though the terms of the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty
would have permitted it to refuse if the United States failed to provide
on request "such assurances as the requested State considers sufficient
that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not
be executed." 28 7 The Canadian government had not uniformly re-
quested such assurances.
The Canadian courts had been generally deferential to the dis-
cretionary decision of the government to extradite. 2 8 In the Burns
case, however, the Canadian government had chosen to extradite two
men wanted for capital murder charges in the state of Washington. 28 9
In deciding the appeal of the extradition, the Canadian Court specifi-
cally held the U.S. capital punishment practices to be arbitrary, in that
innocent persons had a substantial chance of being executed. 290 The
Canadian Court cited a Chicago Tribune study concluding that a num-
ber of persons on Illinois death row were, in fact, innocent,291 a U.S.
Department of Justice study demonstrating a racial disparity in the
application of the death penalty, 292 and the American Bar Associa-
tion's call for a moratorium on the death penalty on the grounds of
inadequate capital representation and racial and socio-economic bias
in sentencing patterns.2 93
284 E-mail from Mark Warren, Dir. of Human Rights Research, Amnesty Int'l, to
Margaret E. McGuinness, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Columbia (July
20, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Warren e-mail].
285 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 287-88.
286 See Kindler v. Can. (Minister of J.), [1991] S.C.R. 779, 780-84; Reference Re
Ng Extradition (Can.), [19911 S.C.R. 858, 859-60.
287 Treaty on Extradition, U.S.-Can., art. 5, Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983.
288 Quigley, supra note 149, at 184-85.
289 Bums, [2001] S.C.R. at 284-85.
290 Id. at 287-88.
291 Id. at 343-44.
292 Id. at 344-45.
293 Id. at 342. The Court did not go so far as to conclude that there was "an
international law norm against the death penalty, or against extradition to face the
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Because it found the death penalty as practiced 
in the United
States to be arbitrary, it further found 
that extradition would run
afoul of Canadian constitutional protection 
against the deprivation of
life "except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental jus-
tice. "294 In the context of extradition, 
the Court held that the Cana-
dian government was required to "ask 
for and obtain an assurance
that the death penalty will not be imposed 
as a condition of extradi-
tion."29 5 This decision has been characterized 
as "a serious embarrass-
ment to the United States,"
296 but it can be seen as one of the ways
foreign courts serve as actors in the process 
of horizontal interna-
tional norm transmission. Further, the 
case had been supported in
Canada by an informal coalition of NGOs, 
academics, and attorneys
who were actively looking for a test case to 
challenge the Court's previ-
ous decision 29
7 that had found no impediments to extraditions 
of cap-
ital defendants to the United States.
2 98 It also demonstrates that
"norm portals" serve as two-way valves, allowing the import or export
of norms that are seen as rights-expanding, 
and preventing the import
or export of norms that are seen as rights-restricting.
The discussion between Babcock, a criminal 
defense attorney,
and a consular officer of the Canadian 
government set off a chain of
events that led, ultimately, to adjudication 
at the IACtHR,
299 the ICJ3 00
and the U.S. Supreme Court
0 1 and to diplomatic tensions between
the United States and its two most important 
economic partners-
Mexico and Canada.
B. The Transnational Advocacy Support Network
As noted earlier, "support structures 
for legal mobilization" are
often the key independent variable in norm 
cascades.30 2 The Medellfn
death penalty" but instead found "significant 
movement towards acceptance interna-
tionally of a principle of fundamental justice 
that Canada has already adopted inter-
nally, namely the abolition of capital punishment." 
Id. at 287.
294 Id. at (quoting Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, art. 7).
295 Id. at 360.
296 Quigley, supra note 149, at 185.
297 Kindler v. Can. (Minister of J.), [1991] 
S.C.R. 779, 782.
298 Warren e-mail, supra note 284.
299 The Right to Information on Consular 
Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory 
Opinion OC-16/99, 1999 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999).
300 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 
(Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij'°rg/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imus
judgment20040
3 3 1 .pdf.
301 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 
(2005).
302 See supra note 55 and accompanying 
text.




line of cases was no exception. A transnational 
network of human
rights activists, NGOs, defense lawyers, 
and, most notably, foreign gov-
ernments, carried out a concerted and 
coordinated effort to bring the
U.S. criminal justice system into conformance 
with the abolition of
the death penalty. These "norm entrepreneurs" 
tactically adopted the
VCCR as part of a broader global strategy 
of abolition. To be sure,
some of the members of this network 
were at different times moti-
vated by additional concerns, including 
holding the United States to
account for its international obligations 
at a time when the unipolarity
of U.S. power was difficult to counterbalance. 
Nonetheless, the net-
work worked centrally toward overturning 
capital convictions and
preventing future death sentences.
30 3
1. The Capital Defense Bar
The capital defense bar was the first 
line in the norm integration.
In addition to the connection with 
and access to the broad transna-
tional abolitionist movement that represented 
the advocacy support
network in these cases, capital defenders 
are amenable to novel argu-
ments of law.
304 Their clients have nothing left to lose 
by such strate-
gies. Thus, it was the capital defense 
bar that began in earnest the
efforts to have U.S. courts consider foreign 
and international practices
in cases challenging the juvenile death 
penalty 05 and execution of
the mentally retarded.
30 6 Looking for any tool to prevent or overturn
a death conviction, the bar stumbled 
on the VCCR, which at least
would provide additional leverage in 
cases of foreign nationals.
Whatever the real or perceived value, 
as one commentator has
observed, "[iln the mid-199
0 s, criminal defense attorneys discovered
303 Only after the initial wave of Medellfn 
cases did advocates seek noncapital 
cases
to test the more doctrinal question 
of the enforceability of an ICJ opinion. 
See
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 
2669, 2684 (2006) (rejecting argument 
that ICJ
decisions are binding and affirming 
conviction of defendant for attempted 
murder
and other felony offenses).
304 See ANNE JAMES ET AL., BRIDGING 
THE GAP: ErFErriVE REPRESENTATION 
OF FOR-
EIGN NATIONALS IN U.S. CRIMINAL 
CASES (2005), available at http://internationaljus-
ticeproject.org/pdfs/BridgingtheGap2nd'pdf 
(giving examples of how attorneys were
and are instructed in these claims).
305 Cf Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 575-79 (2005) (acknowledging 
over-
whelming global opposition to imposing 
the death penalty against juveniles).
306 Cf Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316 n.20 (2002) (noting that imposing 
the
death penalty on the mentally 
retarded is "overwhelmingly disapproved"
internationally).
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the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. '
30 7 Indeed, an article
from 1995 arguing that the VCCR was essential 
to providing adequate
criminal defense for foreign nationals noted 
the value of this "discov-
ery" for criminal defense lawyers:
Thus far, courts have given little attention 
to protecting the
right of consular access. The lack of attention 
stems in part from
the fact that attorneys are often unaware 
of this right and. . . fail to
raise it at trial or to assign the denial 
of consular access as error in
the initial appeal.
3 0 8
The right of consular access was viewed 
as "a linchpin for the effectua-
tion of other rights in the 
criminal process."309
The explicit advice to capital defenders 
was to develop strategies
in criminal cases against foreign 
nationals that would "show
prejudice" from the failure to notify:
Drawing on the lessons we can distill from 
Breard, Rangel-Gonzales
and Faulder, defense counsel should develop 
a record that specifi-
cally demonstrates what the foreign consul 
would do that a defense
attorney would not have been able to accomplish. 
The court deci-
sions... reflect the view that consular assistance 
for actions that the
defense attorney could have taken 
is insufficient for prejudice.
Thus, it is important to emphasize the 
resources and special exper-
tise of the consulate. If the foreign consul 
would have helped with
financial resources for investigation, for 
example, the record could
reflect the additional people who would 
have been interviewed, the
additional trips to the defendant's home 
country that defense coun-
sel would have used to assist in the defense, 
or the additional ex-
perts who would have been 
retained.
310
This advice included, significantly, 
ways in which the role of the
consular officer could be distinguished 
from the role of defense coun-
sel, for example, in explaining the 
importance of the right to remain
silent within the American system 
or the risks inherent in going to
trial versus accepting a plea arrangement.
31 1 Advocates argued that
the notification provision was important 
to help overcome discrimina-
tion based on alienage, particularly 
in capital cases where the prosecu-
307 Linda E. Carter, Compliance with ICJ 
Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Re-
view and Reconsideration under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations: Avena 
and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 117, 119 (2003).
308 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, 
at 727.
309 Id. at 752.




tion, judge and jury enjoy considerable discretion. 12 The criminal
defense bar began to frame the consular notification provision as de-
signed "[t]o compensate for the disadvantages experienced by ac-
cused foreign nationals," '3 t 3 which would appeal to basic judicial
notions of fairness and fair play. An advocacy discussion from 1995
shows how this was accomplished:
Foreign nationals arrested in the United States confront this
disadvantage [of alienage] in several ways. In most cases, they are
unfamiliar with U.S. customs, police policies, and criminal proceed-
ings, For instance, an accused from Latin America would be famil-
iar with the Napoleonic-style legal system, which differs significantly
from practices in the United States. A foreigner may also be partic-
ularly vulnerable to deception used by police detectives as a stan-
dard interrogation technique. Moreover, an accused from a
country with an authoritarian government may anticipate torture or
retaliation against family members; thus, even cajoling statements
by police interrogators may evoke fear.314
In death penalty cases, this perceived marginal advantage of consular
notification became important.
As a result of this discovery of the VCCR taking place within crim-
inal defense circles, early writing in the United States about the VCCR
originated not with the kinds of public international law scholars who
filed amicus briefs in Medellin debating whether Article III courts
should have a role in giving effect to an international courtjudgment,
but with practicing local criminal defense lawyers who joined up with
foreign governments and international human rights advocates.A15 In-
ternational human rights professors were eventually recruited to join
that network, to identify ways to increase VCCR compliance and ways
to develop arguments about noncompliance that could be used in
death penalty cases.
3 16
312 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 739-40; see also supra notes 292-93 and
accompanying text (discussing racial disparities in capital sentencing).
313 See Logene L. Foster & Steven Doggett, Vienna Convention: New Toolfor Repre-
senting Foreign Nationals in the CriminalJustice System, CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 16, 16.
314 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 720.
315 See Robert F. Brooks & William H. Wright, Jr., States Deny Treaty Rights to Foreign
Defendants, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at B8 (Brooks and Wright are practicing attorneys
who represented Mario Murphy and were very active in mobilizing and informing the
legal community); Foster & Dogget, supra note 313, at 18 (noting that Foster and
Doggett practice criminal defense law); Warren e-mail, supra note 284. Shank and
Quigley are law professors, as are Sims and Carter. Sims and Carter's article in CRAM-
PION, supra note 233, was addressed to the defense bar.
316 E-mail from William Aceves, Professor of Law and Dir. of the Int'l Legal Stud-
ies Program, Cal. W. Sch. of Law to Margaret E. McGuinness, Assoc. Professor of Law,
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2. Foreign States as Agents: Litigation and Advocacy
The Medellfn line of cases points out the important role abolition-
ist foreign states have played in chipping away at the death penalty in
the United States.31 7 States acted in a variety of roles: as traditional
unitary instrumental actors, promoting their interest in political, dip-
lomatic and public arenas; as state agents of their citizens, represent-
ing claims before international tribunals; and as norm entrepreneurs,
directly advocating on behalf of their nationals or the nationals of
other abolitionist states.
i. Mexico
Mexico has a unique interest in looking out for the welfare of its
nationals in the United States, the country with the largest number of
expatriate Mexicans. During the 1980s, the number of legal immi-
grants from Mexico in the United States reached three million; an
estimated 800,000 were in the country without documentation. 31 8 By
the end of that decade, Mexican nationals represented the single larg-
est group of noncitizens in the United States, many of whom were
present unlawfully, occupied the lowest rung in the socio-economic
ladder, and were victims of widespread discrimination. 319 Despite
well-known problems with the administration of criminal justice at
home (including endemic corruption and lack of adequate procedu-
ral safeguards),320 Mexico initiated in 1986 the program of Legal Con-
Univ. of Missouri-Columbia (July 31, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aceves
e-mail].
317 See Babcock, supra note 62, at 377 ("Undoubtedly, foreign governments have
been the most influential agents in transnational capital litigation.").
318 Jorge Durand et al., Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities and
Changes, 36 LATIN Am. R s. REv. 107, 107-08 (2001).
319 Approximately one million Mexicans remained undocumented in 1992, which
represented thirty-one percent of the total unauthorized population in the United
States. Id. at 107-08. Precise numbers of foreign nationals are hard to come by. The
Census Bureau estimates that twelve million residents in the United States are nonci-
tizens and that more than twenty million foreigners visit the United States each year.
SeeJumES ET AL., supra note 304, at 5 (citing CampbellJ. Gibson & Emily Lennon, U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the
United States: 1850-1990 (Population Division Working Paper No. 29), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twpsOO29/twpsO029.
html).
320 The Mexican criminal justice system continues to be plagued by poor, over-
crowded prison systems, arbitrary arrests and detentions, corruption, and a lack of
transparency. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HutmAN RIGHTS




sultation and Defense for Mexicans Abroad as a means of supporting
consular officers in their representation of Mexicans facing criminal
legal proceedings outside Mexico.
32'
Mexico has a long history of leveraging consular protection on
behalf of nationals on death row in the United States.322 Mexico's
awareness of the problem of non-notification was heightened by the
Faulder case, and Mexico subsequently played a direct advocacy role
in Fierro v. State.323 Fierro was a Mexican national convicted and sen-
tenced to death for murder of a taxicab driver. Fierro confessed to
the El Paso police five months after the murder.324 The police did not
inform him of his right to notify the Mexican consulate, despite the
fact that Mexico operated a consulate in El Paso.32 5 The circum-
321 In effect, "Mexicans Abroad" meant Mexican nationals in the United States.
Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, paras. 19, 22. This program
was put in place five years after the Mexican Foreign Ministry created a special cate-
gory of consular officer devoted to protecting the interests of Mexican nationals
abroad. Id. This category is roughly equivalent to the American Citizen Services of-
fice within the Consular Affairs Bureau of the U.S. State Department. Thus, more
than forty years lapsed between the time of the 1942 Consular Convention between
the United States and Mexico and the Mexican foreign ministry elevating the protec-
tive consular function to a level of significance.
322 See Meade Affidavit, supra note 105 (describing the measurable impact consu-
lar intervention during the 1920s, '30s and '40s had in helping Mexican nationals
avoid death sentences in the United States).
323 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Mexico was aware of the importance
of the consular notification provisions under the 1923 Claims Convention with the
United States, under which the United States had filed several claims of "denial of
justice." Several of the cases addressed by the Commissioners made reference to the
efforts of United States consular officers to protect the rights of their detained nation-
als. See, e.g., Harry Roberts (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (1926); B.E.
Chattin (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 282 (1927). Among the claims adjudi-
cated by the Commission was that of Walter H. Faulkner, who claimed that Mexican
authorities had prevented him from communicating with the United States consul for
a period of several days. Although the Commission ultimately concluded that claim-
ant failed to prove he was deprived of consular access, it held that "a foreigner, not
familiar with the laws of the country where he temporarily resides, should be given
this opportunity." Walter H. Faulkner (U.S. v. Mex.), Opinions of the Commissioners
Under the Convention Concluded September 8, 1923, at 86, 90 (1926). Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose
Ernesto Medellin at 18, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005
WL 152925.
324 Fierro had been arrested on the tip of a sixteen-year-old with a history of
mental problems, who had claimed to be in the cab with Fierro and witnessed the
murder. Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 725. There was no physical evidence to
connect Fierro to the crime. Id.
325 Id. at 726.
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stances of the confession were questionable.326 The confession was
presented at trial and Fierro was convicted and sentenced to death.
3 2 7
On the basis of a new petition in 1994, a district court threw out the
confession on the ground that there was "a strong likelihood that the
Defendant's confession was coerced by the actions of the Judrez po-
lice" with the acquiescence of the El Paso police.328 On appeal, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the setting aside of
the conviction, finding that the introduction of the confession was
harmless error.3 29 On a 5-4 vote, the Court of Criminal Appeals found
the additional evidence sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict.
33 0
ii. The IACtHR case
In December 1997, just a few months following the executions of
two Mexican citizens-Irineo Tristan Montoya in Texas331 and Mario
Benjamin Murphy in Virginia3.92-Mexico brought a case against the
United States before the LACtHR seeking an advisory opinion as to the
legal obligation of the United States to enforce the Article 36 notifica-
tion requirement and clarification of the minimal judicial remedy for
326 The El Paso police cooperated with the Ciudad Judrez, Mexico police depart-
ment in the investigation, and the CiudadJu~rez police arrested Fierro's mother and
stepfather to question them regarding Fierro. Id. at 725-26. During his questioning
at the El Paso police station, the detective offered to allow Fierro to speak with the
Ciudad Judrez police, who apparently convinced him that his parents would not be
released until he confessed. Id. at 726. The stepfather later testified that as he was
being released in Ciudad Jud1rez, an officer told him that it was because Fierro had
confessed in El Paso. Id.
327 Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
328 Quigley, supra note 149, at 183 (citing Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 371).
329 Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 371-72.
330 Quigley, supra note 149, at 183 (citing Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 377). The prose-
cuting attorney at the trial had filed an affidavit to the appeals court indicating that,
had he known of the circumstances of the confession, he would have joined a motion
to suppress the confession. Id.
331 In re Irineo Tristan Montoya, 520 U.S. 1284 (1997) (denying habeas petition
requesting stay of execution). The fact that Montoya was the first Mexican executed
in the United States in over fifty years galvanized Mexican public opinion. In addi-
tion, Mexico had filed four diplomatic protests with the State Department, filed a
formal request for commutation with the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and
requested a reprieve from the Governor of Texas. See Application of Mexico in the
Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 49, at 22. The April 1997 exoneration and release of
Ricardo Aldape Guerra from Texas death row after serving fifteen years in prison
further focused attention on other Mexicans facing the death penalty in the United
States. See Mexican Long Held in Texas Murder Wins His Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1997, at A16. For more discussion of the Adalpe Guerra case see infra note 356.
332 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1997).
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failure to notify detainees who are subsequently sentenced to
death. 333 The application was thus explicitly limited to capital cases.
The first interpretation of the United States' legal obligations in terms
of a remedy was issued on April 30, 1998, when the Inter-American
Commission made a requested written submission to the IACtHR in
which it concluded that, in death penalty cases, the due process rights
established under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man require a judicial remedy for a violation of the VCCR notifica-
tion provisions. 33 4 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the
International Human Rights Law Institute, and the Minnesota Advo-
cates for Human Rights also made submissions to the IACtHR in sup-
port of a finding of an individual right to a remedy for violations of
Article 36.' 35
The issue for human rights activists was not so much the immedi-
ate fate of the tens of thousands of foreign nationals arrested in the
United States each year, 33 6 but rather the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States. The positions taken by (nearly all) the
other OAS states that submitted briefs, along with the NGO amici, was
similarly rooted in the abolitionist position.3 37
This was the first opportunity for the United States to take a for-
mal position on the question of remedies for non-notification in an
international forum. In addition to submitting several procedural
challenges to the request for advisory opinion,33 8 the United States
argued that the VCCR did not create an individual right to consular
333 Advisory Opinion, supra note 299, para. 1. For a summary of the procedural
basis of the advisory opinion, see William J. Aceves, The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantee of Due Process of Law, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, 555-56 (2000).
334 Aceves, supra note 333, at 556 & n.7. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay also made submissions to the
Court. Id. at 556.
335 Id. at 556.
336 There are no comprehensive statistics available on the total number of foreign
citizens arrested each year in the United States, but the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated at year end 2001 that approximately four percent of the inmate population
in state institutions are noncitizens. SeeJAMEs ET AL., supra note 304, at 5 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/crimoff.htm). Applying the same ratio in the federal prison system, some
52,000 foreign nationals are imprisoned in the United States. Id.
337 The OAS states that retain the death penalty are Guatemala, Guyana, Belize,
Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Grenada (abolitionist in practice), and Bolivia (military
law only). See Amnesty Int'l, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Sept. 5, 2006,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng.
338 See Aceves, supra note 333, at 556.
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assistance but rather "provides that a receiving State must inform a
detainee that, if he requests, sending State consular officers may be
notified of his detention (hence, the term "consular notification")." 339
Further, the United States argued that compliance with the VCCR was
not a prerequisite for observance of human rights in criminal cases.
The international human rights instruments invoked by Mexico in its
petition were applicable to all foreign nationals-regardless of the sta-
tus of consular relations between the two states.
340
In its published opinion of October 1999, the IACtHR addressed
eight issues on the merits of the case:3 41 (1) Based on the text and its
travaux preparatoires, Article 36 "endows a detained foreign national
with individual rights that are the counterpart to the host State's cor-
relative duties;" 342 (2) the right to seek consular assistance under Arti-
cle 36 concerns the protection of human rights and is thus part of the
body of international human rights law;3 43 (3) the phrase "without
delay" included in Article 36(1) (b) requires that foreign nationals be
informed of their right to consular assistance at the time they are de-
tained (time of deprivation of liberty) and in any event before they
are required to make statements to law enforcement officials;3 44 (4)
the sending state need not issue a protest in order to trigger the rights
belonging to the individual foreign national;3 45 (5) Articles 2 (no dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin), 6 (right to life), 14
(equality before the law and fair judicial proceedings), and 50 (appli-
cation to federal states) of the ICCPR concern the protection of
human rights in the American states;346 (6) the dynamic evolution of
international human rights law renders enforcement of Article
36(1) (b) of the VCCR essential to the implementation of due process
of law for all individuals as set out in Article 14 of the ICCPR;3 47 (7)
failure to notify in cases in which the death sentence is imposed is also
an arbitrary deprivation of life that gives rise to state responsibility and
339 Id. at 557 (citing Written Observations of the United States of America 5 (June
10, 1998) (on file with author)).
340 Id.
341 The LACtHR rejected the procedural objections made by the United States and
affirmed its authority to issue advisory opinions. Advisory Opinion, supra note 299,
para. 65.
342 Id. para. 84.
343 Id. para. 141, at 64.
344 Id.
345 Id. para. 141, at 65.
346 Id. Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia
were the only OAS member states not parties to the ICCPR at the time of the opinion.
Id. para. 109.
347 Id. para. 141, at 65.
[VOL. 82:2
NORM PORTALS
an obligation to make reparations;3 48 and (8) the obligations under
Article 36 must be observed regardless of the federal structure of the
United States. - 49
Because it swept so broadly to include arguments based on the
traditional diplomatic remedies of consular violations, the nonappli-
cation of ICCPR to the United States in light of its reservations, and
the limitations on the national government's ability to fashion relief
where the criminal justice system operates largely through federal
states, this opinion provided the basis for subsequent legal arguments
before the ICJ and those in the U.S. courts seeking to give the ICJ
opinions effect.
3 50
Abolitionist academic observers at the time of the opinion were
untroubled by this apparent overreaching because it operated to ex-
pand human rights and limit the application of the death penalty.
William Aceves noted the IACtHR "employ[ed] a teleological method
of interpretation that is reminiscent of the early case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice .... [B]as[ing] its analysis on the notion that
due process is not a static concept; it is dynamic and evolutionary.
'3 55
3. Foreign Governments and NGOs: Role Reversals
Following the IACtHR advisory opinion, Mexico established in
September 2000 the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program
(MCLAP) in the United States, whose mission would be to provide
advisory and financial support to Mexican nationals charged with cap-
ital crimes in the United States. 352 At the time, it was the only such
348 Id. para. 137. In so holding, the Court noted its earlier advisory opinion that
limited capital punishment by the principle of no arbitrary deprivation of life. Id.
para. 134; see also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 3 paras. 52, 55 (Sept. 8, 1983).
349 Advisory Opinion, supra note 299, para. 141 at 65. This conclusion was in line
with an earlier case in which the IACtHR had held that a state may not base its non-
compliance with international obligations on its federal structure. See Garrido and
Baigorria Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 46 (Feb. 6, 1996).
350 Paraguay had filed its complaint in the Breard case in 1998, a year before the
Advisory Opinion was issued; the arguments were nonetheless available-and were
used-in the subsequent IC] cases. See infra Part IV.B.4.
351 Aceves, supra note 333, at 561.
352 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 25. Mexico had
created the Program of Legal Consultation and Defense for Mexicans Abroad which
trained "a select cadre of consular officers in American law for the express purpose of
assisting attorneys representing Mexican nationals in United States legal proceed-
ings." Id. para. 22.
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capital legal assistance program of a 
foreign government in the
United States.
35 3
The stated purpose of the program was to "enhance 
the quality of
legal representation available to Mexican 
capital defendants, to im-
prove the ability of Mexican consular officers 
to assist them, and to
increase awareness of and compliance 
with Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention."35 4 The effect of the program 
was remarkable in address-
ing the very inadequacies in representation 
and bias in sentencing
that had been raised in the earlier, 
unsuccessful challenges based on
non-notification. As Mexico noted in 
its Avena application to the ICJ:
Since its inception, the Program's 
attorneys have assisted with
approximately 110 cases. They have 
played a decisive role in
preventing the imposition of the 
death penalty in 27 cases; 80
others remain pending. Through 
the program, Mexico has filed
amicus curiae briefs in 13 cases and 
offered important legal assis-
tance to defence counsel in 49 other 
cases. Often, Program attor-
neys have raised claims and emphasized 
issues of international law
that would otherwise have been overlooked 
by defence counsel in-
experienced in representing 
foreign nationals.
355
This statement shows how the role 
of the foreign government to
communicate with and, where 
necessary, lodge protests against 
the
national government was supplemented 
by a strategy in which the for-
eign government became an active 
advocate on behalf of its nationals.
In capital cases, the traditional 
consular function carried out by 
the
government of Mexico was aided 
by this super public defender, which
possessed full governmental power 
at home that could be leveraged 
to
assist in the essential functions of 
criminal defense: investigating, 
lo-
cating witnesses, and formulating 
legal defenses-some of them novel
claims based on international human 
rights law.
In addition to providing services 
at the defense counsel level, the
government of Mexico intervened 
directly as a party in several cases
following the IACtHR opinion. Prior 
to the IACtHR opinion, the gov-
ernment of Mexico intervened directly 
in three VCCR cases as a party
or as amicus curiae.
3 56 In the three years following the 
IACtHR opin-
353 Id. para. 25.
354 Id. The first director of the MCLAP 
was Sandra Babcock, the attorney to 
raise
the VCCR claim in the Faulder case. 
See supra text accompanying notes 233-35. 
El
Salvador established a similar program 
in 2003. Warren e-mail, supra note 
284.
355 Application of Mexico in the 
Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 26.
356 See Murphy v. Netherland, 116 
F.3d 97 (4th. Cir. 1997) (listing Mexico 
as ami-
cus curiae assisting the defendant-appellant); 
Consulate Gen. of Mex. v. Phillips, 
17
F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1998); United 
Mexican States v. Woods, No. CV 97-01075-
PHX SMM (D. Ariz. May 19) (filing 
suit for injunction to prevent execution 
of Mexi-
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ion and through the MCLAP, Mexico intervened as amicus curiae in
sixteen cases and funded or assisted an additional ninety-nine cases. 357
While the IACtHR opinion did not appear to shift the receptiveness of
the U.S. government or state or federal courts on the question of rem-
edies for convictions that pre-dated the IACtHR opinion, it laid a sig-
nificant jurisprudential foundation for other challenges in traditional
"vertical" fora such as the ICJ.
4. The Persistence of Traditional Statehood
Mexico did not abandon diplomatic channels after the IACtHR
opinion was issued. It continued to submit diplomatic protests or re-
quests for clemency to state and federal officials. 358 In the two pre-
IACtHR executions-Irineo Tristan Montoya in Texas3 59 and Mario
Benjamin Murphy in Virginia 360-Mexico requested commutation
and federal government intervention with state authorities. In both
cases, the federal government remained silent. 61 After the execu-
tions were carried out, the State Department issued a formal apology
to the government of Mexico for the violations of the VCCR.
36 2
can national who had not received consular notification at time of arrest), affd 126
F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). Mexico also filed an amicus brief in Guerra v. Johnson, 90
F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996); Brief Amicus Curiae of United Mexican States, Guerra, 90
F.3d 1075 (No. 95-20443), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/
guerra/20443ac.html. That case did not involve a VCCR challenge, but instead the
applicability of international norms banning racially discriminatory treatment.
357 Mexico stated in its pleadings in Avena:
Through the combined efforts of consular officers and the Program lawyers,
Mexico has played a decisive role in preventing the imposition of the death
penalty in at least forty-five cases in less than three years. In that same time,
Mexico has filed sixteen amicus curiae briefs in U.S. courts, has provided
funds for investigators and experts in at least twenty-two cases, and has of-
fered important legal assistance to defense counsel in sixty-seven other cases.
Memorial of Mex., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) para. 38 (June
20, 2003) (citations omitteii), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imuspleadings/imus ipleadings-toc.htm.
358 See Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 49 (noting
that Mexico had filed diplomatic notes expressing the "vital nature of the rights to
consular notification" in at least twenty capital cases involving Mexican nationals be-
tween 1997 and 2003).
359 In re Irineo Tristan Montoya, 520 U.S. 1284 (1997).
360 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
361 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, paras. 50-59.
362 See id. para. 53. Mexico accepted the July 1997 apology over the execution of
Montoya, but maintained its view that the United States had to do more than apolo-
gize-particularly in capital cases-and provide some sort of judicial relief in failure
to notify cases. Id. Mexico also noted that, at that time, thirty-six Mexican nationals
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In 2000, Texas executed Miguel Angel Flores and again the State
Department issued Mexico a diplomatic note apologizing for the fail-
ure of Texas authorities to comply with Article 36.363 In 2002, Texas
executed Javier Suarez Medina.36 4 In that case, the Mexican govern-
ment made direct protests through its foreign minister to the U.S.
Secretary of State and President of Mexico directly requested a re-
prieve from the Governor of Texas. 365 Mexico supported Medina's
individual petition to the IACtHR. 3 66 In Medina, Mexico also re-
quested the support of other governments and international organiza-
tions, which submitted their views to courts and the state and federal
officials involved in the case. 367 In the Flores case, Mexico protested
formally to the State Department and to the Texas authorities.
3 68 It
also supported Flores' petition to the IACtHR, which resulted in an
issuance by the IACtHR of precautionary measures.
i. Paraguay
Paraguay intervened in the non-notification case of Angel Breard
in 1996, well before the IACtHR advisory opinion.369 Breard was a
Paraguayan national who was not notified of his right to contact his
consulate, was charged with murder and attempted rape, and subse-
quently tried, convicted and sentenced to death in Virginia state
court.370 Breard raised the VCCR claim for the first time in his federal
habeas action. 371 The government of Paraguay filed suit against the
governor of Virginia in federal court, seeking an injunction of the ex-
remained on death row in the United States; in none of the cases did the arresting
authorities comply with the Article 36 notification requirement. Id. Following the
State Department apology over the execution of Murphy, Mexico again filed a diplo-
matic note stating that apology was an inadequate remedy for violation of the VCCR.
Id. para. 56.
363 Id. paras. 57-58.
364 Id. para. 59.
365 Id.
366 This petition, like that of Flores, resulted in an order of precautionary mea-
sures by the IACtHR. Id.; Javier Suarez Medina, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Re-
port No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5, para. 5 (2005), available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2005eng/USA.12421 eng.htm.
367 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 59. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala. Honduras, Pan-
ama, Paraguay, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Holy
See and the European Union all supported Mexico's efforts. Id.
368 Id. paras. 233-34.
369 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998) (per curiam) (denying certiorari).
370 Id. at 371.
371 Id. at 373.
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ecution and a declaration voiding the conviction as a remedy for the
VCCR violation. 372 This was the first such suit filed by a foreign gov-
ernment directly against a state official seeking to enjoin an execution
and commute a death sentence.373 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Breard's habeas claim was consolidated with the Paraguay suit against
Virginia. Paraguay had filed a parallel case at the ICJ, in which it re-
quested provisional measures to stay Breard's execution while the ICJ
considered Paraguay's application for state remedies against the
United States for the violation of the Convention. The ICJ issued pro-
visional measures requesting that the United States take "all measures
at its disposal" to prevent the execution.374 Four other foreign gov-
ernments filed amici briefs in support of Paraguay in its suit before
the Supreme Court.
375
The Supreme Court refused to give effect to the ICJ provisional
measures order, deciding Breard's appeal on the basis of federal
habeas law, under which Bread's claim was deemed procedurally de-
faulted. 376 The Court found Paraguay's claim against Virginia was
barred under the Eleventh Amendment and failed to state a claim
under § 1983.37 7
ii. Germany
Germany also took on the role of advocate on its own behalf and
on behalf of two German nationals facing the death penalty in Ari-
zona, Karl and Walter LaGrand. Germany started with traditional dip-
lomatic interventions with the U.S. government and Arizona state
officials.378 When those efforts failed to stop the execution of one of
the brothers, Germany wasted no time and filed an application to the
372 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd,
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
373 Mexico became the second when it filed suit against Arizona on behalf of
death row inmate Ramon Martinez Villarreal on the basis of failure to notify. Bab-
cock, supra note 62, at 378-79 & n.47 (citing Complaint, United Mexican States v.
Woods (D.C. Ariz. 1997) (No. CV 97-1075-PHX SMM)). The case was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220,
1221 (9th Cir. 1997). The executions of Murphy and Montoya, see supra notes 331-32
and accompanying text, took place while the Villarreal case was pending.
374 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258
(Apr. 9).
375 Babcock, supra note 62, at 378.
376 Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-77; see also Jonathon I. Charney & W. Michael
Reislman, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 673 (1998) (providing a detailed
factual and procedural summary of the Breard case).
377 Breard, 523 U.S. at 377-78.
378 Babcock, supra note 62, at 381.
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ICJ on March 2, 1999, requesting provisional measures to stay the exe-
cution,3 79 which the ICJ issued the day after the application.""" Ger-
many then filed suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, requesting it to comply with the ICJ order and stay the execu-
tion.38 1 The Supreme Court denied the request for the stay as did the
Arizona governor.3 12 Walter LaGrand was executed.
38 3
Unlike Paraguay, Germany did not drop its case before the ICJ,
but pursued it to a final disposition, in which the ICJ held that the
United States had violated the VCCR, and that it had also violated the
prior provisional measure issued by the ICJ. - 8 4 The ICJ further held
that, in the case of future non-notification for German nationals who
are subjected to "severe penalt(y]," the United States would be re-
quired to provide "review and reconsideration" of the convictions.
38 5
The ICJ opinion was aimed primarily at fashioning an appropriate
remedy for noncompliance in death penalty cases. 386 Most important,
the ICJ agreed with the JACtHR advisory opinion in holding that the
VCCR created an individual right to consular notification and access,
not just a right of the sending state.38 7 The ICJ left the U.S. govern-
ment with some leeway in interpretation of how to carry out the "re-
view and reconsideration" requirement, leaving the "choice of means"
379 Application Instituting Proceedings, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Mar. 2,
1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (follow
"Application" hyperlink).
380 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Order of Mar. 3, 1999), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusorder/igus-iorder19990303.htm.
381 Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
382 Id.; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.CJ. Pleadings 466, paras. 23-28
(June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudg-
ment/igus_ ijudgment20010625.htm.
383 Babcock, supra note 62, at 381.
384 LaGrand, para. 128(5).
385 Id. para. 125.
386 See Babcock, supra note 62, at 382 ("Germany's persistence in obtaining the
Judgment, as well as the decision itself, have served to highlight the international
community's dissatisfaction with the United States' administration of the death pen-
alty."). Interestingly, Germany had argued that had it been aware of the LaGrand
trial, consular officers would have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase
of the trial. The United States argued, effectively as it turns out, that Germany was
unable to demonstrate that it would have provided such assistance in 1984. LaGrand,
para. 72. The Court found it immaterial whether actual assistance would have af-
fected the outcome, but rather held that establishing a violation of Article 36 was
enough to require a remedy; no prejudice need be shown by the defendant. Id. para.
73.
387 Id. para. 128(3).
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to the United States. 388 Up to the time of the Avena decision, this
permitted the United States to take the position that compliance with
a remedy could be brought about through state clemency proceed-
ings; judicial action by U.S. courts would not be necessary to compli-
ance with the ICJ order.38 9
Following the IACtHR advisory opinion in October 1999 and the
ICJ LaGrand final opinion in June 2001, full compliance with the re-
quirement of consular notification at the time of arrest was still not
taking place for Mexicans or other foreign nationals, and Mexican
nationals were not successful in achieving reversals or obtaining collat-
eral relief.390 That was in part due to the fact that the advisory opin-
ion was not binding on the United States. Mexico thus pursued its
case before the ICJ to secure a binding decision that could halt the
executions of other Mexicans on death row. To do so, Mexico ac-
ceded to the dispute resolution provisions of the VCCR, which would
enable it to bring a challenge against the United States before the
icj.391
5. The Collateral Role of International Organizations
The international and domestic governmental institutions that
liberal theory might predict would play a role in promoting norm shift
among persistent objectors have been marginal actors in this case.
With the exception of the IACtHR and its initial legal opinion, the
major human rights organs-the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
388 Id. para. 125.
389 Counter-Memorial of the United States, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.) paras. 6.53-6.78 (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus-ipleadings.20031103_c-mem_06.pdf.
390 See Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 27 ("[Mex-
ico's] assistance often comes too late because local authorities of the constituent
states of the United States have neglected to inform Mexican nationals of their consu-
lar rights. If and when Mexican consulates heard of a detention and prosecution,
many forms of assistance that could have been rendered at an earlier stage have been
foreclosed by the operation of United States municipal law.").
391 William J. Aceves, Consular Notification and the Death Penalty: The ICJ's Judgment
in Avena, ASIL INSIG-Ts, n.7, Apr. 2004, http://www.asil.org/insights.insighl30.htm#.
edn7 (Mexico acceded to the Optional Protocol on March 5, 2002). In a press re-
lease, the Government of Mexico noted that "[t]he main goal of the lodging of this
complaint is for the ICJ to issue a ruling ... regarding the noncompliance by differ-
ent U.S. state and municipal authorities of their international legal obligation covered
by the VCCR." Press Release, Govt of Mex., The Government of Mexico Submits to
the International Court of justice in the Hague the Cases of 54 Mexicans Sentenced
to Death in the U.S. 1 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.internationaljusticepro-
ject.org/pdfs/UnoffTransMexicolCJ.pdf.
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the Human Rights Committee and the U.N. General Assembly-
played almost no role. This is primarily because the United States was
not a party to Optional Protocol 2 of the ICCPR prohibiting the death
penalty and also has not acceded Optional Protocol 1 of that treaty,
through which states agree to be subject to the individual complaint
procedures at the Human Rights Committee.
The most valuable role international institutions played was as
supplemental information conduits. They transmitted public and pri-
vate facts about the application of the death penalty in the United
States and served as a kind of bully pulpit from which abolitionist
states could raise their objections to U.S. practices.3 92 They also
played a role as a chip in the stakes for global human rights reputa-
tion. Following the LaGrand decision, the United States was kicked
off the U.N. Human Rights Commission for the first time in its history.
Notably, however, these institutions did not provide a significant fo-
rum for direct horizontal discussion between the national government
of the United States and the abolitionist states on the death penalty
question. Much of the diplomacy took place through bilateral, not
multilateral, channels.
C. Federal, State and Local Responses Post-IA CtHR
Between 1996 and 2003, the State Department took steps to bring
the United States in compliance with the notification provisions. Con-
sistent with its view that the responsibility for enforcing the VCCR lay
with the executive, not the judiciary, it embarked on a broad educa-
tional program to inform local and state police, prosecutors, and
courts about the notification requirement. 393 The State Department
training materials for state and local law enforcement officials, prose-
cutors, and judges make clear that the importance of the notification
provision is "to help ensure that foreign governments can extend ap-
propriate consular services to their nationals in the United States and
that the United States complies with its legal obligations to such gov-
ernments.'3 94 In turn, states have published their own guidelines on
consular notification to local police.395 These efforts have had an im-
pact on law enforcement officials on the ground, and, importantly, on
state courts.
392 See Olson, supra note 151.
393 See Clark, supra note 219, at 22.
394 See STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 178, at i.
395 See, e.g., GEORGiA DzP'T OF CMw. AFFAIRS, A MODEL LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERA-




Precise, measurable effects on state trial judges are difficult to
come by, in part because many judicial decisions in criminal trials are
unreported, and in part because judges do not always acknowledge
the rationales under which they reached decisions. Among the re-
ported cases, state courts split on the question whether Article 36 cre-
ates an individual right that is judicially cognizable. Illinois state
courts held that the VCCR creates a judicially enforceable individual
right but that suppression of evidence was not available as a rem-
edy.3 9 6 Other courts have held the opposite, finding no judicially en-
forceable right.3 97 Most courts to address the question have, like the
396 People v. Salgado, 854 N.E.2d 266, 277 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (finding that the
defendant "does have individual rights under the Vienna Convention, which were
violated," but the remedy for a violation is not suppression of evidence); People v.
Montano, 848 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that although the VCCR
arguably conveys an individual right, Article 36 "does not create a fundamental," con-
stitutional right); People v. Sanchez, 841 N.E.2d 478, 488 (I1. App. Ct. 2005) (finding
that "despite the recent cases establishing the fact the Vienna Convention is self-exe-
cuting and that an individual right is created," suppression of evidence was not an
appropriate remedy).
397 Several post-Avena federal cases found no judicially enforceable individual
right. SeeMaharaj v. Sec'y for the Dept. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that "the Vienna Convention does not confer judicially enforceable individ-
ual rights" and that "a criminal defendant could not seek to have an indictment dis-
missed based on an alleged violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention"); Ortega
v. Dretke, No. 3-05-CV-0439-R, 2005 WL 1552802, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2005) (fol-
lowing the decisions of the Fifth Circuit which held that Article 36 does not create a
judicially enforceable right); Dimas-Lopez v. United States, No. 01 Civ.7170, 2005 WL
1241890, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) (finding that the VCCR does not convey indi-
vidual rights and therefore is not grounds for vacating a sentence); Moyhernandez v.
United States, No. 02 Civ.8062 MBM, 2004 WL 3035479, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,
2004) (finding that the Vienna Convention "was meant to protect the rights of states
to care for their nationals traveling abroad, not to protect the rights of individuals"
and as a result "If] ailure to notify the consul of a defendant's home country... is not
a basis for dismissing an indictment"). Several post-Avena state cases also found no
judicially enforceable individual right. See People v. Ontiveros, No. D044146, 2006
WL 1725906, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2006) (finding that even if VCCR creates
individual rights, suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy); Gomez v.
Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the "Vienna
Convention does not confer standing on an individual foreign national to assert a
violation of the treaty in a domestic criminal case"); State v. King, 858 A.2d 4, 13 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that no private enforceable right is created under
the VCCR and the exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy); State v.
Homdziuk, 848 A.2d 853, 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that "the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable as a remedy for violation of Article 36 of the VCCR");
People v. Ortiz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding that "[i]t is
questionable whether [the VCCR] confers judicially enforceable rights upon individu-
als, as opposed to foreign states" but in any event, "a violation ... provides no basis for
suppression of a statement"); State v. Linnik, No. CA2004-06-015, 2006 WL 456792, at
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Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas, found that 
even assuming an indi-
vidual right, suppression of evidence under 
the exclusionary rule is
not an appropriate remedy.
398 This suggests that the campaign to in-
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2006) (holding 
that "exclusion of incriminating statements
is not the appropriate remedy for an alleged 
violation of the consular notification
right").
398 There are several state cases in which 
courts found that, even assuming an
individual right, suppression was not an appropriate 
remedy. See People v. Valencia,
No. A099446, 2004 WL 887210, at *3 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004) (noting 
that
"[sluppression is not a proper remedy 
for the failure of police to notify a foreign
national of the right to consular notification 
.. . in light of ... (3) the lack of recipro-
cal rights for American nationals in other 
countries"); Rahmani v. State, 898 So.2d
132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding 
that the requirement to inform a detained
person about their VCCR rights "does not 
arise on the point of arrest and prior to the
custodial interrogation accompanied by 
Mirada warnings"); State v. Byron, 683
N.W.2d 317, 323-24 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding that in order to "obtain a remedy
for violation of the Vienna Convention, 
a defendant must first show that the violation
resulted in actual prejudice," which the defendant 
had not shown); People v. Herrera,
No. 05-208, 2006 WL 758544, at *13 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2006) (finding that
"[s]uppression of an otherwise voluntary 
post arrest statement is not an appropriate
remedy for an alleged Article 36. .. violation"); 
State v. Quintero, No. M2003-0231
1-
CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004, at *10 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2005) (holding that
Article 36 does not give a foreign national 
the right to suppress evidence upon viola-
tion of the treaty). There are also several 
reported and unreported post-Avena fed-
eral cases in which courts arrived at 
the same conclusion. See United States 
v.
Rodriguez, 162 F.App'x 853, 857 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that even if authorities 
had
failed to inform a person of his or her rights 
under the VCCR, "the proper remedy is
not to suppress the statements"); Darby 
v. Hawk-Sawyer, 405 F.3d 942, 946 (11th 
Cir.
2005) (finding that even "[a]ssuming arguendo 
that... the VCCR confers an individ-
ual right to consular assistance, Darby failed 
to show the alleged VCCR violation had 
a
prejudicial effect on his trial"); Cardenas 
v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 244, 253 (5th Cir. 2005)
(finding that even if petitioner's claim 
was not procedurally barred, "his claim 
fails
because this court has determined in the 
past that the Vienna Convention does 
not
confer individually enforceable rights"); 
Acosta v. United States, 130 F.App'x 881, 
883
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a contention 
that petitioner was "wrongly denied the
protections afforded by Article 36(1) 
(b) of the [VCCR]" was unpersuasive); 
United
States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 
1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming 
a previ-
ous decision that determined exclusion 
of evidence in a criminal prosecution is 
not a
proper remedy for a Vienna Convention 
violation); Plata v. Dretke, 11l Fed. App'x.
213, 216 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that petitioner's 
argument regarding "prejudice suf-
fered at trial because he did not understand 
the benefit of pleading guilty before trial
does not make the district court's denial of 
his VCCR claim debatable"); United States
v. Valdez, 104 F.App'x 624, 626-27 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that "even though
Valdez's rights under the Vienna Convention 
were violated, suppression of any
wrongly obtained evidence is not the 
appropriate remedy for such a violation");
United States v. Umbacia, No. 8:05-CR-99-T-24FAJ, 
2005 WL 1424821, at *2-3 (M.D.
Fla. June 17, 2005) (finding that dismissal 
of the indictment would not be an appro-
piate remedy for a VCCR violation); United 
States v. McAtee, No. CR05-2005, 2005
WL 1330683, at *9 (N.D. Iowa June 2, 
2005) (finding that "defendant suffered 
no
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crease compliance with the VCCR and thereby reduce capital
sentences or prevent executions has not been an unalloyed success.
However, the language in some of the reported opinions and the
existence of the training programs in the courts suggest that the noti-
fication requirement is being increasingly enforced and is having a
measurable effect in many places. In Alexander v. State,399 a Mexican
national unlawfully present in the United States was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to fifty-five years.400 On a direct appeal, the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals upheld the conviction against challenges that
did not include a VCCR non-notification claim. 401 Nonetheless, in a
separate concurrence Judge Mathias noted that, while there was no
evidence whether Alexander had been notified of his right to notify
the consulate, the "right to contact a consular officer is an important
right that should not be ignored under any circumstance" and that
"failure to inform a defendant of his or her Vienna Convention right
is particularly egregious in cases . . . where risk of conviction of the
charged crimes carries such a high penalty."402 He went further to
discuss the important reciprocity implications:
American citizens abroad would like to believe that they will be
treated fairly if they have a misfortune that subjects them to the
police, prosecutorial and penal authorities of a country they are vis-
iting. But confidence in such fair treatment is unwarranted if we as
a nation do not set an example in our treatment of foreign nation-
als under similar circumstances in United States courts. I would
therefore urge law enforcement authorities to make such advice of
prejudice as a result of the delayed notification of the Canadian Consulate"); United
States v. Ruiz Gutierrez, No. CRIM.A. 04-470(ESH), 2005 WL 1115952, at *1 (D.D.C.
May 11, 2005) (finding that even if the VCCR does convey individual fights, a dismis-
sal of an indictment would not be an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation);
Carbajal v. United States, No. 99 Civ.1916(MGC), 2004 WL 2283658, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2004) (finding that even if the plaintiff's VCCR rights have been violated,
plaintiff has failed to show how that violation prejudiced him); United States v. Bro-
die, 326 F. Supp. 2d 83, 90 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that "a violation of the Vienna
Convention's requirement does not require suppression"); U.S. ex rel. Hurtado v. Bri-
ley, No. 03-G-7436 2004 WL 1462441, at *4 (ND. 111. June 28, 2004) (denying a claim
for habeas relief after Illinois Appellate Court determined that suppression was an
inappropriate remedy for a Article 36 violation); Jimenez v. Dretke, No. 3:02-CV-1716-
M, 2004 WL 789809, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2004) (finding that even if VCCR did
convey individual rights a petitioner "would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief").
399 837 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
400 Id. at 554-55.
401 The defendant did, however, argue that admitting into evidence his status as
an illegal alien as an aggravating factor in his sentencing was improper. The court
rejected the contention. Id. at 556.
402 Id. at 557. (Mathias, J., concurring).
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a foreign national's right to consular contact standard operating
procedure in order to help establish an efficient and objectively fair
notice and contact process that compliments the Sixth Amendment
indigent right to counsel.
40 3
In other cases where convictions have been overturned on non-
VCCR grounds, it seems clear that the failure to notify is viewed as a
basic violation of fairness by state judges.40 4 State judges have, for ex-
ample, admonished local prosecutors for proceeding with cases in the
absence of consular notification. In two examples in Kansas from
2000, courts announced in dicta the importance they attached to the




The Torres case in Oklahoma state court represents an important
example of the force this appeal to fairness has with state judges.
40 6
Osbaldo Torres was one of the fifty-four Mexicans included in the
Avena application. Two months after the Avena decision was issued,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals voted 3-2 to stay the execu-
tion of Torres and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine if denial of the notification right resulted in prejudice. 40 7 In
an unpublished concurring opinion,Judge Chapel "reasoned that the
United States freely and consensually signed and ratified the Vienna
Convention, including the Optional Protocol, creating binding, con-
tract-like legal obligations between the United States and other State
Parties."4 08 Judge Chapel held that the Oklahoma Court was bound
by the Supremacy Clause to give effect to both the VCCR and the
decision of the ICJ, not because the ICJ operated as superior authority
over U.S. courts, but because the President and Senate had commit-
ted the nation to be bound by the VCCR.40 9 The governor of
Oklahoma granted clemency and commuted Torres' sentence to life
without parole on the explicit grounds that the failure to notify vio-
lated the VCCR.
41 0
403 Id. at 557-58.
404 See Levit, supra note 81, at 183-87.
405 Rebecca E. Woodman, International Miranda? Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, 70J. KAN. B. Ass'N 41, 41 (2001).
406 See Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
407 Levit, supra note 81, at 171-72.
408 Id. at 172 (citing Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1-2
(Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring)).
409 To7rres, 2004 WL 3711623, at *2-3 (Chapel, J., concurring).
410 Levit, supra note 81, at 172-73 (discussing the clemency of Torres). In a later
published opinion reviewing the remand court's analysis of whether the failure to
notify had prejudiced Torres' trial, Judge Chapel wrote for the Oklahoma Court:
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State political branches have stepped in to provide protection as
well. Because of the uncertainty of what legal effect to give a failure to
notify, two states have amended their criminal codes to explicitly re-
quire police notification in all arrests, and additional states have con-
sidered proposals. 41  The motivation behind these statutes is to
eliminate the claim of failure to notify and the additional costs associ-
ated with defending such claims, which certainly weakens, but does
not eliminate, the value of habituating police to notification. 41 2 Re-
gardless of whether the individual who is convicted without notifica-
tion at the time of arrest may raise non-notification as grounds for
suppressing statements, the habit of notification can take hold.
Moreover, the defense bar is now alerted to the value of consular
assistance and will serve as a backstop for police failures. Left open by
Sanchez-Llamas is the potential for a multitude of state and local ap-
proaches to VCCR enforcement, including the fashioning of remedies
for failure to notify. For some states it may mean that failure to raise
the consular assistance claim presents grounds for an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim, for others, grounds for suppression of state-
ments made to police, or to a question of overall prejudice at trial.
Others may opt to eliminate a judicial remedy. Whatever the motives
behind state notification statutes or programs to train local law en-
forcement, they serve to permit the mediating effects of outside actors
and norms to enter into the criminal justice system through the VCCR
norm portal.
The essence of a Vienna Convention claim is that a foreign citizen,
haled before an unfamiliar jurisdiction and accused of a crime, is entitled to
seek the assistance of his government. Even if that assistance cannot, ulti-
mately, affect the outcome of the proceedings, it is a right and privilege of
national citizenship and international law. The issue is not whether a gov-
ernment can actually affect the outcome of a citizen's case, but whether
under the Convention a citizen has the opportunity to seek and receive his
government's help. This protection extends to every signatory of the Con-
vention, including American citizens.
Torres, 120 P.3d at 1187.
411 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c, 5028 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.642
(2005). For cases applying the California statute, see People v. Garcia, No. C047098,
2005 WL 697970 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2005); People v. Valencia, No. A099446, 2004
WL 887210 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004); People v. Pathan, No. H022600, 2002 WL
31854948 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002); People v. Ortiz, No. B145601, 2002 WL
937642 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 2002). But see State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573
(Or. 2005) (decided before the Oregon statute was law, holding that the VCCR does
not confer individual rights to a detained foreign national to be asserted in a criminal
proceeding).
412 Aceves e-mail, supra note 316.
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By the timeJose Medellfn filed his cert petition with the Supreme
Court, a shift had occurred that resulted in: (1) improved law enforce-
ment compliance with the notification procedure; (2) involvement of
foreign governments with meaningful defense of nationals in capital
cases; (3) heightened vigilance of defense counsel on the value of
consular involvement in consular cases; (4) openness of state court
judges to the value of consular assistance; 413 (5) increased awareness
in the general public (and thus among potential jurors) of potential
disadvantages of foreign nationals facing the death penalty; (6) in-
creased receptiveness of governors and other state politicians to ap-
peals to procedural fairness; and (7) a measurable increase in
commutations and clemencies and an accompanying decrease in capi-
tal sentences applied to foreign nationals.
4 14
If the Medellin line of cases resulted in only one clemency and the
avoidance of a death sentence in only a handful of cases, it can never-
theless be measured as a shift toward de facto abolition. And, to the
extent that these measurable shifts toward the abolitionist norm have
already taken place on the ground within the criminal justice systems
of the federal states, it diminishes the significance of any failure of
vertical enforcement of the Avena ruling by the Supreme Court.
V. THE SALIENCE OF NoRM PORTALS
Given the myriad actors and various horizontal and vertical
processes at work in the Medellin cases, how can we determine which
factors were determinative in pushing the abolitionist norm to a tip-
ping point? Part of the purpose of a constructivist approach is to
move away from the over-determination of input factors that marks
rational choice analysis. It is thus important to understand how all of
the processes and actors contributed to the norm shift. International
human rights law is centrally concerned with giving domestic legal ef-
fect to international legal norms. It is therefore useful to identify the
criteria and conditions under which domestic legal institutions courts
change to become amenable to an appeal to international human
rights.
Identification of those criteria and conditions is helpful not only
as a descriptive matter, but can help predict ways in which external
norms can be imported into the systems of persistent objectors. Un-
derstanding the nature of those mechanisms will also make them ame-
nable to the kind of scrutiny necessary for domestic democratic
413 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 81, at 183-86 (highlighting the role of "state court
judges as co-participants in the making and shaping of international legal norms").
414 See supra notes 404-12 and accompanying text.
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accountability. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that
these transnational efforts did not occur in a vacuum. While the
VCCR was being invoked as a norm portal through which to introduce
increased procedural protections toward an abolitionist norm, other
efforts were taking place in the United States to expose problems in
the administration of the death penalty.
Why was the adoption of the VCCR as a norm portal successful in
these cases? First, the VCCR appeals to judges' and government offi-
cials' sense of obligation. While the United States may be under no
obligation to curtail the death penalty, it has made a promise to abide
by the reciprocal obligations of the VCCR. 415 The governor of
Oklahoma, in granting clemency in Torres, was quite explicit: "'I took
into account the fact that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention
and is part of that treaty' . . . .,,46 All through the Medellin line of
cases, state and federal courts have indicated in dicta the importance
attached to such national promises. 41 7 Second, as a reciprocal obliga-
tion, the VCCR appealed to judges' and politicians' sense of duty not
to engage in acts of omission or commission that would put Ameri-
cans in harm's way. Third, it is formal. A treaty, like a statute, offers
judges concrete guidelines for what is expected. This differentiates
use of norm portals from more general discussions of appeals to for-
eign or international legal trends that can, rightly, be criticized as se-
lective or vague. The language of Article 36 is, to be sure, subject to
interpretation on the question of appropriate remedy, but the general
requirement of notification is not vague or ephemeral and the U.S.
government has repeatedly underscored exactly the rationales at stake
in notification. Fourth, it is a procedural requirement and thus allows
state government officials cover to comply with the treaty without hav-
ing to support explicitly the expansion of rights-and the correspond-
ing reduction in death sentences-that is facilitated by such
compliance. Finally, as a self-executing treaty binding on the state
and federal governments, it can be invoked and enforced without re-
spect to the enforceability of the ICJ opinion. To be sure, some state
courts have restricted the availability ofjudicially cognizable remedies,
and the decoupling of U.S.-fashioned remedies allowed under
Sanchez-Llamas permits them to continue to do so. The aggregate ef-
fect of the cases, however, has been to increase compliance with notifi-
415 I owe Phil Peters a special thanks for suggesting this line of inquiry.
416 Press Release, State of Okla. Office of Gov. Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants
Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://wwwgover-
nor.state.ok.us/display.article.php?article id=301 &article type=l.
417 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
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cation and thus achieve the desired reduction in overall death
sentences.
A. Medellin Within the Typology of Norm Transfer
In the Medellin cases, norms were communicated, elaborated and
integrated horizontally and vertically at domestic, transnational and
international levels of interaction. The notification rule was a treaty
obligation enforceable through the vertical command and control of
a supranational court. In these cases, however, it operated as a hori-
zontal entry point into the criminal justice system of the states-at the
law enforcement, judicial and political levels-through which domes-
tic courts were confronted with external norms. That entry point was
the well-established, codified, and formalized function of consular
protection, which mediated between the outside norm and the do-
mestic practice.
In addition to the use of the VCCR as a horizontal norm portal,
the process of norm transfer in these cases included supranational
adjudication (ICJ, IACtHR), informal vertical efforts (UN resolution
on rights of aliens), and of course, informal horizontal efforts by advo-
cacy support networks. These methods of norm integration in the Me-
dellin cases can be mapped out, broadly, against the typology of norm
integration. (See Table 1).
TABLE 1 TYPOLOGY OF METHODS OF HuMAN RIGHTS
NoRM INTEGRATION
ISignificance in
Type Characteristics Examples Medellin cases
Formal Vertical f Supranational adjudication ICJ, ECHR, ECJ, Medium
_ _ IACtHR
Informal Aspirational institutions, UN Human Rights Low
Vertical norm-setting charters Comm.; General
Assembly
Formal Norm portals; procedural Extradition treaties, High
Horizontal gateways VCCR, Refugee
Convention
Informal Political and social NGOs networks, Medium
Horizontal interactions, information bilateral and
sharing, acculturation multilateral diplomacy
The VCCR case study demonstrates the ways in which state and
nonstate actors engage in the process of norm transfer in traditional
and nontraditional ways and illustrates the value of the soft empiri-
cism or thick description of constructivism. Applying the constructiv-
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ist methodology to the Medellfn cases reveals 
that neither informal nor
formal legal mechanisms are independently responsible 
for the norm
shift. The vertical process of norm integration 
through courts was not
determinative to the cases. For example, 
a definitive ruling by the
Supreme Court on whether the VCCR 
itself or the ICJ order in Avena
are to be given direct effect by U.S. courts 
was not necessary to the
overall shift. At the same time, appeals 
to international courts were
crucial along the way to elaborating 
the emerging norm. The 1999
advisory opinion of the IACtHR,
418 however, was a key step toward
integrating the notification provision 
into a new international stan-
dard of procedural justice in death penalty 
cases. This suggests that
international tribunals serve a norm-announcing 
role beyond the
"command and control" function.
419
The ICJ in this case may have provided 
a technically narrow rul-
ing intended to elaborate the rights and 
obligations under the VCCR
to the parties before it, but it had the 
effect of announcing an en-
hanced standard of treatment 
for aliens facing the death penalty.
420 It
is thus less important whether the narrow 
ruling is given direct effect
in national courts. The norm announcement 
can serve as either per-
suasive authority or the kind of dicta 
that appeals to a general sense of
fairness for state judges and officials.
NGOs and advocates also operated in 
interesting ways. Individual
advocates and clients proved essential 
to the initiation of the norm
cascade that contributed to a quantifiable 
norm shift on the applica-
tion of the death penalty. NGOs stepped 
into the shoes of nation-
states in some cases. In this case, NGOs 
acted as a kind of watchdog
for all the governments outside the 
United States, and served as a
bridge between public defenders and 
the consulates, providing direct
resources and services to consular officials 
to assist them in carrying
out their official roles.
421
418 Advisory Opinion, supra note 299.
419 See ChristopherJ. Borgen, Transnational 
Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms:
The Hegemony of Process, 38 GEO. WAsHi. 
INT'L L. Rrv. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript
at 25-27, available at http://ssrn.corD/abstract-
7 9 3 4 85).
420 The language of the opinion was 
"severe penalties." Avena and Other 
Mexican
Nationals, 2004 I.CJ. 1, para. 151 
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icj
www/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imusjudgment 
20040331.pdf. This leaves
open the possibility that the additional 
consideration due foreign nationals 
facing life
sentences without parole may be vulnerable 
to a concerted assault through the VCCR
norm portal. In any event, the 1CJ 
was not extending the protections 
to minor
crimes.
421 See generallyJAMEs ET AL., supra 
note 304 (explaining that the document 
is in-
tended to be used by attorneys defending 
foreign nationals).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Despite the persistence of traditional diplomacy as a method of
interaction, relative to the role of other actors, the role of nation-
states qua states appears to be diminishing in transnational human
rights litigation. This bears out constructivist and TLP predictions
about the role of nonstate actors and the salience of norms and ideas
themselves. Mexico, Germany, and Paraguay each supplemented in-
terstate diplomacy with direct appeals to the subsidiary federal states,
and with direct participation as amici or litigants in U.S. proceedings.
Sandra Babcock has said the following of Paraguay's and Mex-
ico's efforts in these cases:
Viewed through the lens of Koh's [TLP] model, Paraguay's and
Mexico's efforts on behalf of their nationals succeeded in provoking
interactions with the lower federal courts, the US Supreme Court,
the ICJ and several foreign governments, furthering the internaliza-
tion of international norms regarding the death penalty. Today,
dozens of foreign nationals on death row continue to litigate the
claims first raised by Faulder, Breard and others. Foreign govern-
ments have also continued their efforts to block the executions of
their nationals, by litigating both in domestic courts and before in-
ternational tribunals. This litigation has led other international law-
making fora to issue decisions condemning the execution of foreign
nationals who were deprived of any opportunity for consular
assistance.
422
Missing from Babcock's description are the international condi-
tions that made it possible, even likely, that Mexico and Paraguay
would challenge the United States on the death penalty. The essential
pre-condition was the shifting international consensus on the death
penalty. The Medellin cases came about when they did because the
abolition of the death penalty had reached an international tipping
point. Between 1989 and 1995, co-extensive with the end of the Cold
War and the emergence of several newly democratic and democratiz-
ing states, the international norm moved from one of death penalty
toleration to abolition. This shift was powerful enough to prompt
states to take a position on judicial enforceability of individual rights
under the VCCR that seemed at odds with the history of consular
protection.
The death penalty norm cascade further primed the IACtHR and
ICJ to rule on the VCCR in a way that appeared to be contrary to long-
standing practice and interpretation of the parties to the convention.
Some might argue that the parties to the international litigations were
motivated by anti-Americanism, or at least an attempt to assert sover-
422 Babcock, supra note 62, at 379.
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eignty and counterbalance U.S. political hegemony through legal
challenges. Such views cannot be totally discounted, as diplomatic
and political motivations certainly played a role along with the anti-
death penalty concerns. Whatever the motivations, however, it was
the fact of widespread VCCR noncompliance of the United States that
enabled the international tribunals to rule as they did.
The Medellin line of cases also raises some interesting questions
about the U.S. reaction. The U.S. position that the notification provi-
sion of the VCCR did not create a judicially cognizable individual
right was consistent up through and beyond the adverse Avena ruling.
U.S. courts are generally deferential to the executive branch on ques-
tions of treaty interpretation.423 Here, the U.S. government acted,
often in contradictory ways, through multiple disaggregated entities,
each with a slightly different approach. Taken together, these disag-
gregated acts dilute the effect of American persistent objection to de
jure abolition. At the federal level, those disaggregated entities were
the State Department (consistently arguing at the international level
to give no judicial effect to the VCCR, 424 but appealing directly to
state governors for clemency and setting in place training and gui-
dance on notification procedures), 425 Congress (keeping in place the
restrictions on habeas appeal and failing to adopt national guidelines
on notification),426 and the President (issuing a memorandum of
compliance with Avena, unilaterally withdrawing from the Optional
Protocol of the VCCR).427 At the state and local levels, police and
prosecutors shifted practice in response to federal pressures, and leg-
islatures have taken up the question of whether and how to codify the
notification obligation.4 28 While federalism has been viewed as an ob-
stacle to bringing U.S. human rights practices up to the international
standard, the use of the VCCR demonstrates that state courts can be
more receptive to arguments based on international law, particularly
where the argument is made through a formal U.S. commitment. 42 9
423 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 77, at 442-51.
424 See, e.g., Avena, 2004 I.C.J., paras. 29-30; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), para.
40 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudg-
ment/igus ijudgment20010625.htm.
425 See, e.g., supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
426 See supra text accompanying note 206.
427 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
428 See, e.g., supra note 411 and accompanying text.
429 A notable example is the Missouri Supreme Court, which in Roper v. Simmons
invoked views of the international community. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003), affd, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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It would be misleading to suggest that invoking the VCCR as a
norm portal was the only tactic being applied by transnational and
domestic abolitionist advocacy networks. The period between 1990
and 2004 witnessed a variety of other approaches and innovations to
limiting the judicial application of the death penalty in the United
States that coincided with the appeal to international norms.43 0 The
measurable reduction in death sentences and actual executions be-
tween 1995 and 2005 is therefore likely the product of several vari-
ables: changes in the attitude and behavior of jurors and judges; a
reduction of the kinds of violent crimes eligible for capital punish-
ment; innocence projects; and even political expediency. 43' The fact
that VCCR-based claims were just one of many factors contributing to
this de facto reduction in death penalty sentences and executions,
however, does not lessen its value as a norm portal. As with many
other areas of human rights expansion, many frontal attacks on the
practice can be made at once.
The fact that the VCCR has been invoked as a norm portal for
purposes other than to reduce the death penalty also does not dimin-
ish its overall salience. Indeed, that it has been invoked to ensure
minimal due process and overcome prejudice, bias, or discrimination
against foreign nationals in accordance with international standards
tends to support its importance as a norm portal for external norms.
Further, the fact that the VCCR may centrally protect sovereign pre-
rogatives of protection does not dilute its role as a norm portal. Other
treaties or structures that serve as norm portals may have other pri-
mary purposes-extradition treaties are not, for example, fundamen-
tally a filter system, but are intended to facilitate and make more
expedient the transfer of suspects and defendants.432 That they can
additionally serve to mediate between legal systems and harmonize
death penalty practice, does not detract from their central purpose.433
430 Among these were the rise of the use of DNA to try to prove actual innocence,
and the publication of several important studies demonstrating high rates of error
and racial bias in capital sentencing. For links to studies and relevant articles, see
Int'l Justice Project, Brief Bank & General Resources, http://www.internationaljustice
project.org/briefs.cfm#resources (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
431 Following Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), juries, not judges, must deter-
mine death sentences. Id. at 587. In December of that year Kansas also declared the
death penalty unconstitutional under its state constitution. See State v. Marsh, 102
P.3d 445, 458 (Kan. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
432 See M. CHERIF BAsslOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 735-49 (4th ed. 2002).
433 Requiring assurances that the death penalty will not be sought against extradit-
able defendants usually results in an agreement to seek, at most, a life sentence. Id. at
739 n.476 (citing U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty).
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Historically, American advocates have resisted raising interna-
tional law generally (and international human rights defenses in crim-
inal cases more specifically) in U.S. courts. Sandra Babcock attributes
this resistance to education: "International law is not a required sub-
ject in the vast majority of law schools in the United States. As a result,
few law school graduates understand the relevance of international
law in domestic legal proceedings."4 34 An additional reason posited is
the related concern that judges-themselves the products of law
school experiences that did not adequately introduce them to interna-
tional law-will be unreceptive: "'[Llitigators [ ... look at judges,
and assess what they will find persuasive. International law has not fit
that criteria. Indeed, some litigators have been concerned that cita-
tions to international law would signal an essential weakness in their
case under domestic law.'- 435 Thus, the actions of the judges in these
cases will affect the ways in which future litigants raise international
human rights arguments.
The Medellin cases suggest that perhaps judges (and state offi-
cials) care more about some kinds of international law than others.
Here, the VCCR represented a firm promise made by the United
States. The federal government acknowledged its obligations under
the VCCR and even conceded the widespread noncompliance with
the notification provisions.436 Congress made clear that the treaty
would be "self-executing," that is, it would not require implementing
legislation.437 This is in contrast with appeals in the Atkins and Roper
cases to the ICCPR Optional Protocol 2 or the International Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child as evidence of a standard: the United
States was not party to those international obligations.
B. Mapping Other Norm Portals
Understanding how the formal horizontal method of norm trans-
fer has operated in the VCCR case is illustrative of how other norm
portals may operate to facilitate the entry of horizontal integration of
international human rights into the legal systems of other persistent
objectors or noncompliant states.438 Bilateral extradition treaties and
international refugee law have operated in the past to limit the appli-
434 Babcock, supra note 62, at 374 n.31.
435 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Martha F. Davis, Lecture, International
Human Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REv. 417,
418 (2000)).
436 See supra text accompanying note 212.
437 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
438 See supra tbl.
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cation of the death penalty in foreign states. 439 In both those formal
systems, a binding treaty obligation acts to export international and for-
eign norms. In extradition, bilateral and multilateral treaties have
been used as a means through which to consider the appropriateness
of the death penalty, with many states refusing to extradite in the ab-
sence of a guarantee that the death penalty will not be sought. 440 In
refugee cases, a host of international human rights standards (includ-
ing prohibitions against the death penalty, torture and cruel, inhu-
man and degrading treatment) have been applied to practices that
that have been interpreted by different national courts as meeting the
standard of "reasonable fear of persecution" established in the Refu-
gee Convention. 441 These interpretations have the effect of prevent-
ing future human rights violations in the sending state and thus, in
effect, altering the practice in that state as regards specific individuals
or broad classes. Some arguments made by human rights activists to
invoke immigration law in the pursuit of human rights protection sug-
gest that general immigration law-which establishes a literal portal to
states' jurisdictions-might also serve as a norm portal for transna-
tional regulation of human rights. 442
International jurisdictional rules may also serve as horizontal
norm portals. Through criminal universal jurisdiction, for example,
criminal jurisdiction is permitted in all legal systems on the theory
that all countries are bound by jus cogens norms to prosecute crimes
against humanity without regard to principles of territorial or national
439 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 432, at 735-51 (discussing the death penalty as
grounds for exception, exemption or exclusion under a number of bilateral and mul-
tilateral extradition treaties); see, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, art. V, U.S.-Britain-N. Ir., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREAIY Doc. No. 108-23, art.
1; see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, art.
I(A) (2), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
440 See discussion of Canadian extradition cases supra notes 285-301. See also In re
Soering, 1988 CRiM. L. REv. 307. For a discussion of Soering, see BAssIOUNI, supra note
432, at 739-41.
441 See Refugee Convention, supra note 439, art. I(A)(2); see also GUY GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-79 (2d ed. 1996) (examining what prac-
tices are considered persecution under the Convention); Lori A. Nessel, Forced to
Choose: Torture, Family Reunification and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REv.
897, 897 & n.5 (2005) (discussing national asylum laws that prohibit repatriation of
foreign nationals who will face death penalty or torture upon return to their home
country).
442 See, e.g., William J. Aceves & Paul L. Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to Protect




jurisdiction.443 Efforts to expand universal jurisdiction to include ju-
risdiction over civil claims, such as mass environmental torts, may re-
present a new mechanism through which to import international
norms into the legal systems of persistent objectors.
444
C. The Robustness of Norm Portals
Rather than dilute the democratic accountability of laws that are
applied in U.S. courts, use of norm portals may be democracy-enhanc-
ing. Norm portals are formal mechanisms that reflect the increased
legalization of the modern international human rights system. While
the international human rights system may, as a matter of philosophi-
cal underpinning, represent a return to natural law and a move away
from the positivism that marked interstate relations in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, it is nonetheless a formal system
4 45
Norm portals, as formal mechanisms, add a layer of precision to the
process through which international human rights norms seep into
domestic legal systems. This formalism may also save them from the
democracy concerns raised when nonbinding foreign or international
law is directly invoked in U.S. courts.
Moreover, the use of international human rights law is different
from the application of other international law and, of course, foreign
law. International human rights law is typically only invoked when it is
rights-expanding. Thus, objections to substantive human rights are
infrequently used by the U.S. government to defend nonenforcement.
Rather, the government tends to rely on other formal elements of in-
ternational law to argue that the external norm is unenforceable in
U.S. courts. In particular, the government invokes the international
law of treaties to defend nonadoption of a norm (as with ICCPR Op-
tional Protocol 2), the law of reservations to treaties to defend federal-
ism constraints on enforcement (as with U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR), and also the general limits of the applicability of customary
international law in those areas where the United States has not
adopted the treaty standard. The Eighth Amendment arguably pro-
vides a unique constitutional entry point (perhaps acting as a norm
portal within the Bill of Rights) in that it permits taking into account
443 See, e.g., James Cockayne, On the Cosmopolitanization of Criminal Jurisdiction, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 514, 523 (2005) (book review).
444 These examples are merely illustrative. I plan a more comprehensive mapping
of potential norm portals as a follow-on project.
445 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in
REALiZING HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 15-16 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison eds., 2000);




international fairness under the "evolving 
standards" of "cruel and
unusual."
4 46
That is not to say that some international 
standards on human
rights may present unique dilemmas for 
the United States. Interna-
tional interpretations of the "right to 
life" that might also incorporate
a ban on abortion may conflict with the 
privacy rights outlined in Roe
v. Wade.4 4 7 International protections 
against some kinds of speech
might similarly run afoul of U.S. constitutional 
protections. In those
cases, the United States can respond 
to an open norm portal by shut-
ting it through withdrawal from the 
treaty, but it is not clear that with-
drawal is a practical option for 
the VCCR (or, for that matter,
extradition treaties).
The VCCR is of such fundamental importance 
to the protection
of U.S. business and American citizens 
abroad that withdrawal may
not, in practice, be feasible. The United 
States has done the next best
thing by withdrawing from the Optional 
Protocol. Withdrawal from
the protocol does not, however, appear 
to have affected the norm
shift that has already occurred in 
U.S. courts. While it is true as a
doctrinal matter that the ICJ opinions 
in LaGrand and Avena are only
directly binding on the parties to those 
cases, and that withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol prevents 
any future ICJ litigation on the
matter, those cases in which the VCCR 
is interpreted as creating an
individual right to which a concrete 
remedy must be provided, remain
as an international rule of decision 
for interpretation of the rights of
foreign nationals. The VCCR has thus 
accomplished a one-way impor-
tation of additional protection in capital 
cases. And it is already hav-
ing important residual effects in noncapital 
cases and civil cases.
448
Norm portals also serve an important 
role in interstate relations
by equalizing the reciprocity game. The 
United States takes the VCCR
seriously because it is concerned that 
it have full access to American
citizens who are detained overseas. 
Thus, when the State Department
communicated its concerns with 
the governors of Virginia and
Oklahoma, it focused on this reciprocity 
of obligation. Of course, the
VCCR does not offer tit-for-tat opportunities 
for retaliation as, for ex-
ample, violations of the trade regime 
under the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding. Moreover, the 
parties who might wish to
retaliate, for example, by detaining 
American citizens without access
to the U.S. government, are not inclined 
to do so in light of over-
446 See Harry A. Blackmun, The 
Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 
104 YALE L.J.
39, 48 (1994).
447 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
448 See, e.g., jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 
367, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
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whelming U.S. power and its ability to inflict greater economic or
even military harm. Nonetheless, the invocation of the VCCR or an
extradition treaty offers a formalized method of extracting a penalty
from the United States for failing in its reciprocal obligation.
CONCLUSION
The sovereigntists are right that views of people outside the
United States are affecting how cases get decided. But they are wrong
about how it is coming about. The fears of unaccountable, cosmopoli-
tan judges with life tenure picking and choosing from international
and foreign decisions are as overblown as the claims of responsible
global judicial dialogue. It was not the judges on the international
cocktail circuit who brought about the norm shift in these cases. In-
deed, Justice Breyer seemed to concede the relatively minor role of
judges in the process of legal globalization when he put the burden
on lawyers to raise international law issues in their arguments.449 To
the extent that judges do take on an internationalist bent, it is in ex-
tremely subtle ways, and ways which are, ultimately, framed in U.S.
notions of fairness and justice-a kind of "good" American
exceptionalism. 450
It was also not "unaccountable" international institutions that
started the norm cascade, but rather individual advocates and na-
tional governments.451 Norm portals may facilitate changes in U.S.
human rights practice that some sovereigntists will object to as reflect-
ing restraints on U.S. power. The Medellin cases demonstrate, how-
ever, that invocation of international human rights law through the
VCCR norm portal has operated similarly to other novel claims in U.S.
courts that have led to "tipping points" on important social and legal
norms.
Following Sanchez-Llamas, state officials and judges are free to
elaborate the obligations of the VCCR and require state remedies for
failure to comply fully with the notification provision. Such actions
raise none of the democratic or sovereignty concerns implicated when
nonbinding foreign or international law is invoked in interpreting in-
449 Breyer, supra note 23, at 267-68.
450 See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479,
1480-94 (2003) (distinguishing between "good" American exceptionalism emanating
from historical, cultural and political distinctions that result in exemplary U.S. human
rights performance from "bad" exceptionalism under which the United States re-
mains outside the international legal fold).
451 See supra Part WV.B.
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dividual rights under the Constitution. 452 Indeed, short of acceding
to international commitments to abolish capital punishment, the
VCCR norm portal may represent the most effective and democrati-
cally defensible means through which to help nudge U.S. human
rights practice toward the international standard.
452 Seejudith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE Lj. 1564, 1598-1606 (2006).
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